A Reluctant Commander
The three most important military campaigns of Ambrose E. Burnside's career are — coincidentally — linked to water.
Born on May 23, 1824 in Indiana, Burnside entered West Point with the help of his father's connections. He commanded a garrison during the Mexican-American War and was wounded by Apaches in 1849. He resigned his commission in 1853 and formed a company to manufacture breechloading rifles of his own design, but the company failed. He then joined the Illinois Central Railroad, where he was befriended by George McClellan. At the start of the American Civil War, Burnside organized the 1st Rhode Island Infantry Volunteers and commanded a brigade credibly at Bull Run.
Burnside was one of many who believed the Union army had lost an opportunity to end the rebellion at the First Battle of Bull Run (Manassas). He proposed an ambitious plan to invade North Carolina, a plan that was accepted and Burnside was given the force's command. The Naval Division, as it was called, travelled down the coast in a ragtag collection of vessels. Burnside showed his own personal valour by giving up his own comfortable steamer for an almost unseaworthy and much smaller vessel called Picket. During a gale that almost sank the steamer, Burnside seemed to be everywhere at once, trying to maintain his command. These morale boosting efforts worked and his men admired him greatly. The invasion fleet was a success, but his Naval Division could not make a significant breakthrough as his his friend, McClellan, was grabbing all available men and resources for his own Peninsula Campaign. Even so, Burnside's operation was one of the first Union successes and he was promoted to Major General.
In July 1862, elements of Burnside's command were transferred to the Army of the Potomac. Burnside himself was asked twice to command the army, but he turned it down both times. He was well liked by his men. He often wore a tall slouch hat that distinguised him in the field, and he was recognizeable by his thick side whiskers. In spite of his popularity, he did not feel he was sufficiently capable to run the army himself. Instead, the army was split with the bulk of it given over to Major General John Pope. After the Union defeat at the Battle of Second Bull Run/Manassas the army was given back to McClellan. McClellan, in turn, gave Burnside command of the Right Wing of the army in time for the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
Burnside's performance during the late summer of 1862 was lackluster. He was slow to advance at South Mountain after the initial hard fighting. This allowed the Confederates to coalesce on the other side of the Antietam creek. At Antietam, Burnside failed to investigate fords across Antietam Creek, and thus became fixated with taking the stone bridge across the deep part of the creek. Burnside eventually crossed the waterway but the assault was costly and he was slow to organize his forces after the crossing. By the time his men moved on the town of Sharpsburg, A. P. Hill's Confederate corps arrived and hit Burnside in the flank. If he had been more aggressive and assertive in crossing the creek, he could have given the Army of the Potomac a resounding victory, and could have quite possibly been instrumental in the destruction of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. Instead, the battle was virtually a draw, though the Union claimed victory when Lee retreated.
In two major campaigns, Burnside had distinguished himself in one and was a disappointment in the other. In spite of the latter (and partly because of the former) Burnside was asked a third time to command the Army of the Potomac.
After the Battle of Antietam, Maj. Gen. George McClellan was slow — to put it mildly — in the pursuit of the Confederate army. In spite of having a good portion of his army unengaged and heavily outnumbering the enemy, McClellan did not rush to engage the retreating Southerners. Lee withdrew across the Potomac River on September 18, but McClellan had still not moved to follow by October 6. Abraham Lincoln instructed him to follow, but McClellan replied with excuses. The army (which Lincoln derisively called "McClellan's bodyguard") did not cross into Virginia until October 26. On November 7, McClellan received new orders relieving him of command of the Army of the Potomac.
Burnside also received orders on November 7, instructing him to take command of the army. His orders had arrived earlier in that day, hand delivered by Brigadier General Catharinus P. Buckingham, the War Department's adjutant general. The politicians in Washington feared that McClellan might stage a coup d'etat and wanted to make sure Burnside took command before relieving McClellan. Lincoln thought that as a friend of McClellan's Burnside would be more easily accepted by the troops. For his part, Burnside was still reluctant to take command. Buckingham pointed out that if Burnside didn't accept, the command would go to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker. Burnside wouldn't have this, as Hooker had been Burnside's subordinate. Burnside accepted the promotion.
Both Armies Reorganize
McClellan, after speeches and ceremonies, handed command over to Burnside on November 10, 1862. Burnside reorganized the army into three "grand divisions". Instead of the corps commanders reporting directly to Burnside, the corps commanders would report to the grand division commanders, who would in turn report to Burnside.
The Left Grand Division, consisting of Brigadier General John Reynolds' First Corps and Maj. Gen. William Smith's Sixth Corps, was placed under the command of Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin. Franklin had commanded the Sixth Corps during the Peninsula and Antietam campaigns (he was less than stellar during the latter). He was skeptical of Burnside as a commanding officer.
The Center Grand Division, with Brig. Gen. George Stoneman's Third Corps and Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield's Fifth Corps, was placed under Maj. Gen. Joseph "Fighting Joe" Hooker. Hooker fought well in the Peninsula and at Antietam, but it was partially the thought of Hooker getting command of the army — and Burnside's belief that Hooker would make an inferior commander — that convinced Burnside to take command. There were many, though, that thought Hooker should have been made commander of the army, not the least of whom was Hooker himself. Right away, Burnside had to deal with a subordinate who thought he could — and should — be doing Burnside's job and another who had little faith in his commander's abilities.
The Right Grand Division was placed under the command of Maj. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner. It consisted of Maj. Gen. Darius Couch's Second Corps and the Ninth Corps of Brig. Gen. Orlando Wilcox. Sumner was the oldest serving general in the Union army, having been born on January 30, 1797. In spite of his age, he was an active commander (and was admonished for leading his Corps from the front lines at Antietam). As an "old army" man, he didn't play the political games of other generals and felt it his duty to obey his new commanding officer.
The Army of the Potomac wasn't the only army reorganizing in the Eastern Theatre. The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under General Robert E. Lee "reorganized" but this was mostly cosmetic. The Confederate government voted to allow the rank of "Lieutenant General", which allowed the formal creation of corps within the Confederate armies. Until then, Lee got around this restriction by giving Maj. Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson and Maj. Gen. James Longstreet a "wing" of the army. These wings were corps in everything but name.
On November 6, 1862, Jackson and Longstreet were both promoted to Lieutenant General, and their "wings" became formal corps. By that time, the Army of Northern Viriginia was spread out along northern Virginia, waiting for McClellan to finally make a move. When word reached Lee that Burnside had taken command, he wasn't sure what to think. He "understood" McClellan. Burnside, though, was an unknown quantity and likely to be more aggressive.
Burnside's Plan
Burnside looked over the maps of Virginia. He wanted his base of supply at Aquia Landing. Lee and his army were on the other side of the Rappahannock. The closest point for crossing the river was the small town Fredericksburg, Virginia.
Dating back to before the Revolution, Fredericksburg was the location of one of George Washington's homes. The town lay roughly north-south beside the Rappahannock River, just down the river from the junction of the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, with buildings right up to the water in places. The built up area ran about 4000 yards along the river and spread no more than 2000 yards west of the riverbank at its widest point. The town was on a raised plain, so that anyone travelling across the river by boat was hidden from the bank once they had travelled halfway across.
Between 600 and 1,000 yards beyone the edge of the town was a steep hill called Marye's (pronounced "Marie's") Heights. Telegraph Road ran south from the Heights along a series of small hills: Howison, Willis and Prospect Hills. Unknown to the Union, Telegraph Road had been extended on Marye's Heights. It ran just below the ridge with a stone wall protecting it.
From the base of the hill, this sunken road and wall combination formed a natural defensive trench. Today, the stone wall stands like any other stone wall. Visitors to the battlefield may wonder why it wasn't destroyed by Union artillery. At the time of the battle, earth from the digging of the sunken road had been piled up in front of the wall and left to overgrow. This made the road and wall invisible from the east, and produced an unintended fortification. The road ended at Hanover Street. To cover the rest of the hill between Hanover Street and the Plank Road, the Confederates dug rifle pits before the Union assault.
On the opposite side of the river, slightly to the north and a little bit away from the river, was the town of Falmouth. South and east of Falmouth was Stafford Heights, which rose higher than Marye's Heights across the river from it.
Burnside intended to move quickly, crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and advance on Richmond before the Confederates could combine their army and intercept him. The one wrinkle in his plan was the actual river crossing. The permanent bridges across the river were destroyed earlier in the war. To cross, Burnside would have to lay pontoon bridges. He inquired to their availability and was promised that they would be on their way by November 17.
He submitted his plan to Lincoln and it was approved November 14. Lincoln, before approving the plan, was warned that for it to work the plan had to be executed quickly. Lincoln relayed this caution to Burnside.
Armies Converge at Fredericksburg
Burnside hoped that his army's movements would be interpreted as a move to its winter camp at Aquia Landing. Sumner's Grand Division with 37,000 men moved from Warrenton on November 15, arriving at Falmouth on the 17th. Franklin's Grand Division of almost 54,000 men left the Warrenton area on the 16th and arrived two days later. Hooker's Grand Division, totalling almost 48,000 men, left on the 17th and arrived in the vicinity of Fredericskburg on the 19th of November.
The pontoon bridges had still not arrived.
The Confederates were not idle. Lee sent a small force consisting of the 15th Virginia Cavalry regiment, 4 companies of Mississippi infantry, and a light artillery battery to act as a garrison in the town. As word came of the Union army arriving near the town, Lee sent word to Maj. Gen. J.E.B. ("Jeb") Stuart to move his cavalry force of 8,000 men across the river to conduct a reconnaissance mission. The same day, November 18, he had Longstreet move his corps of 38,000 men to the Fredericksburg area. Still not knowing Burnside's intentions and because Burnside still hadn't moved close to the town, Lee had Jackson keep his corps of 37,000 men near Winchester as a deterrent. It continued to forage as Burnside waited for the pontoon bridges.
Longstreet's men arrived on Marye's Heights on November 23. The next day, Burnside's pontoon bridges began to arrive. On the 26th, Lee received word that the Union army was massing at Fredericksburg for an attack. He ordered Jackson to move to the town.
The rest of the pontoons arrived on the 27th. Confederate artillery fired on the Union positions, and the Union's artillery fired back, silencing the Rebel guns. Burnside worried that this had given the game away, but the Confederates had already guessed what he was up to. On the 17th there had been few Southerners watching his movements. Ten days later, half the Army of Northern Virginia was present. By the time the artillery began to duel, Lee already knew Burnside's intentions.
On December 1, Jackson arrived with his 36,000 men. The entire Confederate force, including Stuart's command and the reserve artillery, added up to about 85,000 men. Burnside had about 150,000 men. Burnside's plan had relied on speed, surprise, and weight of numbers. Now he was down to one out of three.
Burnside asked Lincoln on November 27 for permission to conduct a frontal assault on the Confederates, but with a modified plan of crossing downstream at Skinker's Neck. Lincoln preferred a three point attack along the fords of the Rapphannock. Burnside didn't like this idea. His men had little faith in their new commander and were not in high spirits. A withdrawal from the enemy in front of them in order to work around their flank could, in his estimation, demoralize the army. He also felt that such a move would telegraph his intentions to Lee. Lincoln eventually relented and let Burnside conduct his frontal assault.
When Burnside called his grand division commanders together to explain his plan, they all accepted it except for Joe Hooker. Hooker thought the idea of crossing the river in the face of the enemy was suicidal. Burnside brushed away his objections. He ordered gunboats to move down the river. On December 4, the gunboats were attacked by shore batteries at Skinker's Neck and retreated back downstream. A hydrogen balloon put up to view troop movements reported troops at Skinker's Neck and nearby Port Royal. Burnside now believed Lee had figured out his plan, when in fact Lee merely defended against several possibilities. Burnside reviewed this news and considered it likely that Lee had weakened his centre to strengthen his right flank. Underestimating Lee's flexibility, he reverted back to his original plan of crossing at Fredericksburg. He telegraphed Washington on Dec. 9 telling them of his plan. In spite of warnings from some of his officers that the assault would result in a huge slaughter, the Union commander moved to lay his bridges. The attack was set for December 11.
