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Hooker's Chancellorsville Campaign

Part 3: Stonewall's Last Battle

The Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1, 1863 – May 4, 1863

May 1, 1863

Communication Breakdown

The Spotsylvania Wilderness, known simply as The Wilderness, was the home to iron mines and foundries since revolutionary time. The first growth timber in the area had been stripped bare of trees to make into charcoal to fire the furnaces. At the time of the battle only one foundry, Catharine Furnace, was in operation, having recently been re-opened to supply iron to the Confederacy. This new second growth forest was covered in scrub oak, dwarf pine, cedar, hickory and dense brambles. There were pockets of swampy land. The woods deadened sound. The men who fought there in 1863 and again in 1864 would fear and loathe this eerie place.

The Wilderness created a special problem for battlefield communications. There were very few hills and no clear lines of communication. Hooker's plan called for complex movements of army corps. To maintain communications, Hooker put in place a system of telegraphs. He wasn't the first commander to use telegraphs for communications purposes, but he was the first to coordinate such a complex effort in moving large bodies of men separated by such a distance.

Telegraph equipment was fairly robust at this time, but it was hard for a mobile army to use. Telegraph stations required large, heavy lead acid batteries, and operators well trained in Morse-code. A man by the name of George W. Beardslee invented a more portable system. Instead of Morse-code it used devices with dials and synchronized pointers. Instead of batteries it used hand cranked magnetos. Unfortunately, the devices were easily knocked out of synchronization, resulting in garbled messages, and they had a range of only about 5 miles.

On the evening of April 30, the Signal Corps was required to extend their telegraph system to US Ford. Later, it was required to extend the system even further by stringing wires over the pontoon bridge to link up with Hooker's headquarters in the Chancellor House. The wire was taken from another line, so it was already used and wasn't in the best condition. Butterfield ordered the extension of the system and hadn't allowed time for the line to be tested. The line already strained the Beardslee machines to their limits. Wagons and carriages along the road to the ford often knocked over the poles holding up the line. Lightning hit the station at US Ford and de-gaussed the magneto, requiring repairs to re-magnetize it. Hooker went from having superb intelligence to receiving sporadic, and often garbled, messages on the first day of the battle.

(Click on the map for a larger version)

Map 1: The Battle of Chancellorsville – May 1 to May 2, 1863. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.

Columns Collide

Hooker's plan for May 1, the fifth day of the campaign, was to advance in three columns. Meade would follow the River Road to the north and uncover Bank's Ford with two of his divisions, Griffin's in the lead, followed by Humphrey's. Slocum's Twelfth Corps would advance further south along the Orange Plank Road. In the middle was Sykes' division of Meade's Fifth Corps, which would advance along the Orange Turnpike. Couch's Second Corps would move west then south towards Todd's Tavern. Hancock's division of Couch's corps would support Sykes while Howard's Eleventh Corps would support Slocum. When the columns reached their objectives they would make a solid front and attack the Confederates. His plan called for them to take the heights at Fredericksburg in the afternoon.

All Hooker had for intelligence was a message from 5:30 a.m. that Jackson was still opposite the river crossings, and a sighting of Rebel earthworks by Maj. Gen. Gouverneur Warren. Warren spotted the earthworks 3 miles down the Turnpike from Chancellorsville. Hooker ordered the march thinking that only Anderson and McLaws stood in his way. Unknown to Hooker, Jackson had also ordered an advance. Both the Union and the Confederate forces were heading towards the same goal, the clearing around Tabernacle Church.

That morning Jackson, at the head of his corps, came upon McLaws' men entrenching. He instead prepared them for the attack. He ordered Brig. Gen. William Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division to advance first down the Orange Turnpike, with McLaws following up. Brig. Gen. E. A. Perry and Brig. Gen. C. M. Wilcox's brigades of Anderson's division would guard the rear of the column. On the Orange Plank Road, Brig. Gen. Carnot Posey's brigade and Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright's brigade (both of Anderson's division) would advance followed by Jackson's own Corps (Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division and Brig. Gen. Richard Rodes' division). Brig. Gen. R. E. Colston's division of Jackson's command was still en route from Fredericksburg and would act as the reserve when it arrived.

At 11:30 a.m., Sykes came upon the lead elements of McLaws men. His Regular Army troops deployed for combat at the Alsop homestead, about 3 miles from Chancellorsville. The Confederates were advancing, which was a surprise as they had expected the Rebels to be on the defensive. Meade's column moved along the River Road, which bent northward. This created a gap between Sykes' division and the rest of Fifth Corps. There were few roads running between the Turnpike and the River Road. Attempts to communicate between Sykes and Meade failed due to the difficulty in moving cross country in the Wilderness. The Confederates encountered Sykes at a particularly good location, as the Mine Road and Duerson's Mill Road ran from the River Road and intersected the Turnpike at Zoan Church, only 3/4 of a mile in front of Sykes. In fact, had Meade known of Sykes predicament he was in an excellent position to use those roads to effect a flanking attack on McLaws.

At about the same time as Sykes encountered McLaws, Hooker sent an order to Butterfield for Sedgwick's corps to produce a "demonstration" on their front. This was intended to pin down Jackson's troops so that they wouldn't be able to aid McLaws and Anderson. Hooker didn't know that Jackson had already moved. In any event communication foul ups prevented Butterfield from receiving the order until 4:55 p.m.

Slocum, on Sykes' right, had moved out at 11 a.m. A mile from Chancellorsville they encountered a Rebel picket post. Instead of sweeping it up, they deployed in battle formation. They tried to move through the woods in formation but that proved futile. They came out at a large clearing around the Alrich farmstead, where they met the head of Jackson's main column. Slocum was about 2 miles behind and to the right of Sykes. This left Sykes Division on its own, with the threat of both flanks being enveloped.

At about 1:30 p.m., Hooker received word of Slocum engaging the enemy far short of his objective. At about the same time. Warren came back to Hooker with news of Sykes predicament. Sykes' men had backed off to the Lewis farm where they were better covered on the flanks by the woods, but Confederate troops were still moving to outflank him.

While Hooker considered his options, communications from Butterfield and the BMI started to arrive. He now knew that Jackson had advanced on him. The BMI estimated Jackson's force at 48,000 men (the actual number was 48,300, the BMI continuing to be stunningly accurate). Hooker's force was less than 30,000. This included Meade, whose course actually took him away from the Confederates. Sykes had 4,350 men, Slocum had 13,500. Their scheduled reinforcements were Hancock's division of 5,800 and Howard's corps of 13,000. This would even the odds, but since Meade still hadn't encountered anyone, the two main columns colliding with Jackson would be outnumbered, and the reinforcements would take some time to arrive.

Hooker ordered the columns to fall back to Chancellorsville. Couch had arrived at Sykes' position in advance of his men and had wanted to stand his ground. Hooker reiterated his order. In later years Hooker would be criticized strongly for this, but in light of being outnumbered it was the prudent thing to do. It also fit in with his battle plan. He had forced Lee out of his Fredericksburg defences, now it was time to goad Lee into attacking his defensive line.

Once Hooker began to retreat, Jackson pushed towards him. Sykes made a fighting retreat as McLaws' and Anderson's men continued to hammer away at his division. Hancock's division was moved in to relieve Sykes. Both of Hancock's flanks were being enveloped before he, too, retreated back to Chancellorsville. Slocum, though, wasn't as deeply engaged. He was able to pull back with minor losses.

Jackson sent the brigade of Brig. Gen. Rans Wright around the right flank of Slocum's corps. They reached the Catharine Furnace ironworks at 6 p.m., to the south and rear of Chancellorsville. There they met up with Jeb Stuart and the 1st Virginia cavalry. Stuart indicated that there were Yankees at the clearing at Hazel Grove farmstead. Through muddy, marshy ground they marched towards Hazel Grove. There they encountered the 123rd New York and 3rd Wisconsin regiments. Behind them in the clearing was the divisional artillery of Maj. Gen. Alpheus Williams' division, Slocum's corps. The 123rd NY was in its first real fight, and though they waivered they didn't break. By sundown, with the Union artillery raining down on the Rebels, Jackson pulled Wright's brigade back from Hazel Grove.

Hooker Gives Up the Initiative

Hooker said that Lee, "must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and gives us battle on our own ground". That is exactly what had happened. Now Hooker had what he wanted: a defensive battle on ground of his own choosing. In deciding to go for a defensive battle he gave up the initiative to Robert E. Lee, and Lee was very good at making use of the initiative. Still, Hooker's battle plan was intact.

That is, mostly intact. Sedgwick had been ordered in the afternoon of May 1 to turn his demonstration into an attack but that order arrived before the order to initiate the demonstration in the first place, so it had done nothing more than confuse Sedgwick. Through garbled communications Hooker was of the impression that Sedgwick and Reynolds were back on the north side of the river. This resulted in more confusing communications. One thing was certain, trains were still moving into Fredericksburg. Stoneman still hadn't cut Lee's supply lines, something that was key to Hooker's battle plan. To compound Stoneman's tardiness, the single brigade of cavalry left with the army for screening purposes was proving to be far too small to keep the Confederate cavalry from owning the roads around Chancellorsville.

There was one communication foul up that would have an impact on the battle far greater than any other. Hooker's troops dug in around Chancellorsville. Meade held the left flank, anchored at the Rappahannock, along the Mineral Springs Road. Couch covered the eastern edge of the Chancellorsville clearing, and Slocum covered the southern edge. Sickles' Third Corps was moved in behind Slocum as a reserve. That left Howard's Eleventh Corps to guard the right flank. Howard's corps extended along the Orange Turnpike with his right ending at The Wilderness. Hooker suggested that Howard pull back some of his troops so that his line would protect against anyone coming out of the woods on his right, but Howard declined, stating that any pull back would hurt the morale of his men. Still, Hooker was concerned about his right flank.

He sent a message — this time by courier — to Reynolds. Reynold's First Corps was to move immediately from the river, over to US Ford, and place itself on Howard's flank. Reynolds would thus anchor the extreme right of Hooker's line against the Rapidan River. The order was written at 1:55 a.m. The courier arrived at Reynolds' headquarters at 4:55 a.m. on May 2, having taken 3 hours to travel 5 miles. It was now 15 minutes before sunrise. Reynolds would have to move across the bridges in daylight. As his men began to march, they came under fire from Confederate artillery. A pontoon bridge was damaged before the Rebel artillery was silenced. It was repaired and the men began marching again. Reynolds had lost valuable time. His men would end up spending the afternoon of March 2 marching towards Chancellorsville instead of digging in beside Howard.

The Last Meeting

Lee moved up to join Jackson, but he let Jackson control the operation on May 1. Lee reconnoitered the right side of his line. Jackson went over to view the fighting with Wright's brigade, and then made his way back to headquarters as the sun set. There, he and Lee sat on a log discussing their next moves.

Later, after the significance of this discussion was understood, witnesses would try to remember what was said between the two generals. This resulted in often contradictory testimony. Some suggested that Jackson came up with the plan, but this was refuted — directly — by Lee after the war. Lee had reconnoitered the right side of his line and found that it wasn't conducive to assaulting the Union army. Lee knew as well as Hooker that he had to either "ingloriously fly" or attack Hooker on ground of the Union general's choosing. Lee needed a bold move to get out from under the predicament that he had put himself by underestimating "Mr. F. J. Hooker". Before Jackson came back to camp, Lee made the decision to attack the Federal right flank.

The two men sat talking into the night. Staff officers were sent out to the right to confirm Lee's opinion of operations on that side of the line. Stuart joined Lee and Jackson, and then was sent out to Catharine Furnace to gain information. With Union cavalry hardly any presence at all, Stuart's cavalry rode around with impunity. Fitzhugh Lee had skirmished with men of Brig. Gen. Alexander Schimmelfennig's brigade of Howard's Eleventh Corps some two miles west of Chancellorsville. Somewhere in that area was the far right flank of Hooker's army.

Stuart remembered that Jackson's chaplain, Beverley Tucker Lacy, was from the area. Lacy was sent for by Lee. Lacy laid out a route along local roads that would take the Confederates towards Catharine Furnace where they would swing in an arc south, then west, then north to join up with the Orange Turnpike at Wilderness Tavern. Lee outlined the route for Jackson, giving him Stuart's cavalry for cover. Jackson said that his men would move out at 4 a.m. The generals settled down in bivouac for the night.

Jackson woke before Lee to prepare his men. He had Lacy trace the route out on a map. When he studied it, he felt that it brought his troops too close to the Union line. The only other route they could see would take them by way of Todd's Tavern, which was a much longer route. Lacy didn't know of a better route, but he thought that Charles C. Wellford — manager of Catharine Furnace — might. Jackson sent Lacy and Jed Hotchkiss, Jackson's mapmaker, to find Wellford. They roused Wellford from his sleep and he agreed to help. He laid out a faster route over a new timber road and offered his son as a guide. When Hotchkiss and Lacy returned, they found Jackson and Lee discussing the plan while sitting on abandoned Yankee hardtack boxes. The generals agreed to the new route.

Hotchkiss recorded the exchange that followed:

Gen. Lee began by saying, "Well, General Jackson, what do you propose to do?" Gen. Jackson, moving his finger over the route indicated on the map, said, "I propose to go right around there." Gen. L. replied, "What do you propose to do it with?" Gen. J. said, "With my whole command." Gen. Lee then said, "What will you leave me here to hold the Federal army with?" Gen. J. replied, "The two divisions that you have here." After a pause Gen. Lee said, "Well, go ahead."

Lee took a pencil and paper, and started making notes for his orders. When he was done, Jackson stood up, saluted, and said, "My troops will move at once, sir."

Lee's move was bold, to the point of audacious. Splitting up an army in the face of the enemy was a dangerous gamble. It risked the enemy falling heavily on one part of the army and defeating it before moving onto the other part. The term for this is "defeat in detail". Lee had already split his army once, now he proposed to do it a second time. His tactical situation was desperate. His reaction to Hooker's movements had to be bold.

Jackson usually had his men moving by first light, however there was just too much preparation required on the morning of May 2. Then an artillery duel broke out between guns attached to A. P. Hill's division and two Federal batteries, which sent men scrambling for cover. The lead infantry regiments of Rodes Division, following behind Jeb Stuart's cavalry, didn't move out until about 7 a.m. Following were Brig. Gen. Raleigh Colston's division and then Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill's division.

Soon after the column began moving, at a point where Catharine Furnace Road turned off to the south from the Orange Plank Road, Lee stood watching Rodes' men move past. Jackson rode up. The two had a brief conversation that has gone unrecorded. Jackson gestured towards the enemy, Lee nodded, and Jackson rode off.

It was the last meeting of Gen. Robert E. Lee and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson.

May 2, 1863

Hooker Inspects Howard

During the night, Sickles' Third Corps arrived and Hooker moved it into reserve behind Meade's and Slocum's corps. Hooker was still concerned about his right flank. At 8 a.m., Hooker inspected the Eleventh Corps. With Hooker and Howard during the inspection was Sickles and Capt. Cyrus Comstock, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac. Howard's corps faced south along the Orange Turnpike except for two infantry units at the extreme right end of the battle line — the 54th New York infantry regiment and the 153rd Pennsylvania infantry regiment — and two guns of Dieckmann's 13th New York artillery battery. These units were the only ones that faced west. Due to Howard extending his line west, there were gaps in the divisions of Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz and Brig. Gen. Charles Devens. Comstock said to Howard "General, do close those spaces!" Howard indicated the thick Wilderness and said, "Will anybody come through there?" Capt. Comstock replied, quickly and prophetically, "Oh, they may!"

While Hooker inspected the Eleventh Corps, Jackson began moving his troops. In 1862 Jackson made a name for himself by using one corps to pin down a couple of Union armies in the Shenandoah Valley. His fast movement and quick attacks led the Union to believe they were engaging a force much larger than it was. Jackson's men became known as his "foot cavalry". At 7 a.m. his "foot cavalry" moved west towards Catharine Furnace, a mile south of the Union army. Fighting and poor rations had taken their toll. Jackson's "foot cavalry" moved more slowly than they had a year earlier.

As they started their manoeuvre, Lee began probing the Union left. Unlike the right flank, the left flank was anchored against the Rappahannock. All told, the Union line now consisted of 5 corps and more than 72,000 men, with Reynold's corps approaching. Lee couldn't afford an all out attack but he had to attack in sufficient strength to pin down Hooker's men. McLaws' and Anderson's troops began a spirited effort to keep the North unbalanced. The probes confirmed what Hooker had told his men to expect, that Lee would attack.

At 8 a.m. Jackson's men marched west and then swung south at Catharine Furnace. They were spotted by Union observers. These reports were sent to Brig. Gen. David Birney of Sickles' Third Corps, dug in at Hazel Grove. The observers said that a steady procession of Rebel infantry, with artillery and trains, was crossing the open space at Catharine Furnace from the east "toward the right". Birney forwarded the report on to Maj. Gen. Dan Sickles, but Sickles was on the inspection tour with Hooker. The report sat at Sickles' headquarters for half an hour.

At 9 a.m. Hooker received word of the movement of Jackson's men. Sickles asked Hooker if he could bring up a section of rifled guns to attack the column. Hooker gave his approval. At 10 a.m., two Federal 10-pounder Parrotts fired at Jackson's column. Over the next hour, four more guns joined in. Jackson's men had to move quickly across the clearing. His wagons were ordered to take a longer but safer route. There were no casualties resulting from this shelling.

When Hooker received Birney's report, he wrote a dispatch to Howard. The dispatch told Howard that he had set up his men to receive a frontal attack. He was ordered to prepare for an attack from the front and from the flank. The dispatch was sent at 9:30 a.m. Then Hooker sent a similar dispatch to both Slocum and Howard, apparently to strengthen the message.

Howard had been up all night and was asleep, so it was Maj. Gen. Carl Schurz who received Hooker's message. Schurz woke Howard at 10 a.m. with the dispatch. While they discussed it, the second dispatch arrived. Schurz would later claim that he had argued vehemently with Howard that they had to strengthen their flank. Stonewall Jackson was marching, and Jackson was famous as a "flanker". Whether this was recollection after the fact or not, Howard did nothing more than post Signal Corps Capt. Davis. E. Castle on the Turnpike a mile west of Dowdall's Tavern with orders to communicate any enemy movement. Howard would claim 25 years later that he received no dispatch, however the return receipts for the dispatch were filed along with other Eleventh Corps papers, proving that he had received them. Howard simply trusted the dense Wilderness to protect his flank.

Mistakes At Fredericksburg

Having secured (or thought he'd secured) his right flank, Hooker wrote orders to cover his left flank. He gave Sedgwick a discretionary order to attack Early's men in front of him "if an opportunity presents itself with a reasonable expectation of success".

If he had given this order to a Reynolds or a Meade, the effect would have been an aggressive move against Early. Unfortunately Sedgwick was a disciple of George McClellan, the man Abraham Lincoln removed as commander of the Army of the Potomac for being too cautious. Sedgwick had also been wounded three times at Antietam, and in fifteen minutes his division had suffered 2,200 casualties. It's not surprising he was cautious. To make matters worse, he never had a clear indication of what his role would be in the campaign. Sedgwick interpreted the discretionary orders as conservatively as possible. He took no action that day except to discuss Hooker's message with Butterfield in person. Hooker still referred to Sedgwick as being on the Union side of the river, confusing Sedgwick. The two men agreed to interpret the spirt of Hooker's message, but that wasn't enough to shift Sedgwick.

The irony of Sedgwick's caution is that a major mistake occurred within Robert E. Lee's own staff. At almost the same moment Hooker was writing his order for Sedgwick, Lee was issuing a discretionary order for Early. Lee wanted Early to judge the Yankee movements in front of him. If it looked as though the Yankees were weakening their force, Early was to leave a small holding force in place and move the rest of his men to join up with Lee. He had given Early the same order, in person, the day before. Today, he gave the order through his chief of staff, Col. Robert Chilton, who was to communicate the order to Early verbally.

Unfortunately, Chilton had changed the tone of the order as he passed it on. Instead of communicating the spirit of Lee's orders, Chilton made the discretionary order sound like a direct order. Early, thus, was being ordered by Chilton (though he thought by Lee) to leave a brigade at Fredericksburg, move the artillery to the reserve, and move the rest of his force to join with Lee. Early protested this order, profanely. He couldn't believe Lee was ordering him to pull out in the face of a full Yankee corps. He asked Chilton if Lee was fully aware of the situation. Early later wrote, "The Col. said he assumed General Lee understood all this..."

Early left the 21st Mississippi regiment of Barksdale's brigade at Fredericksburg and detailed Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays' Louisiana Brigade to man the rest of the defensive position. With that, he moved the artillery, except for fifteen guns, to the reserve and began moving his men out to join Lee. Now there were less than 3,000 men defending Fredericksburg against Sedgwick's corps of more than 20,000.

This would have been a complete disaster for Lee if it wasn't for Sedwick's caution. Early tried his best to hide the pull out but the day was clear and sunny, and there was no hiding from the Signal Corps' telescopes. Butterfield passed this information on to Sedgwick, starting as early as 10:30 a.m., but Sedgwick appeared paralyzed without a direct order. He had the chance to seize the initiative back in favour of the Union and fall on Lee's rear, forcing Lee to retreat or be totally surrounded. Sedgwick let the chance slip through his fingers. Later, Chilton's mistake would prove to be a blessing in disguise.

The Retreat That Wasn't

Lee's force in front of Hooker maintained heavy, aggressive picketing but they were told not to bring about a general engagement. Lee was outnumbered. His plan called for pinning Hooker in place while Jackson outflanked the Union army. Hooker, for his part, began the day by willing Lee to assault his prepared defense.

Meanwhile, Jackson's column was on the move in sight of Dan Sickles. Sickles repeatedly petitioned Hooker for permission to attack the column. Eventually Hooker relented, ordering Sickles to "advance cautiously" in order to "harass the movement". Sickles advanced Brig. Gen. David Birney's division, with two regiments of Berdan's Sharpshooters in the lead.

Guarding Jackson's column as it moved across the clearing at Catharine Furnace was the 23rd Georgia regiment of Rodes' division, under Col. Emory Best. They were pinned down by the accurate fire of the sharpshooters. They retreated under fire, were eventually pinned down, and surrendered to the overwhelming force. Only three men were wounded, but 296 were captured. They had done their job, though, and had guarded the rear of Jackson's line.

Once in the clearing the Federals could see the Rebels were moving southward, not westward. This was the southward portion of Jackson's mostly westward march. Sickles assumed that the wagons he was seeing meant the army was in retreat. He passed this on to Hooker at 1:30 p.m.

Lee moved Posey's and Wright's brigades to his left when he heard of Birney's attack. Archer's and Thomas' brigades of Hills division were the trailing elements of Jackson's column. They were turned around to offer Posey and Wright support if needed.

Sickles ordered the division of Brig. Gen. Amiel Whipple and the rest of Birney's division into the conflict. He then requested reinforcements from Slocum's and Howard's corps. Hooker sent in the divisions of Brig. Gen. Alpheus Williams and Brig. Gen. John Geary of Slocum's corps to try and turn Lee's line. This assault around Catharine Furnace would produce few results, as the Union soldiers were hampered by Confederate artillery and the thick woods.

Sickles' request for reinforcements arrived at Howard's headquarters at 3 p.m. Howard replied that he had no reserve to spare, as part of Hooker's 9:30 a.m. order required him to keep a reserve. The request arrived again an hour later, this time with Hooker's permission. Howard, now believing the Rebel army was in retreat, gave Sickles the reserve brigade of Brig. Gen. Francis Barlow. Presumably as a show of leadership, Howard escorted the brigade to Third Corps personally. This kept him absent from Eleventh Corps headquarters for the rest of the afternoon.

The Union army believed Lee was in retreat, and not just due to Sickles' observation. There had been plenty of time for Stoneman to cut Lee's supply lines, so a retreat by Lee was expected. Then there was Chilton's erroneous error to Early. By pulling Early out accidentally, it looked to the Union as though Lee was preparing for a withdrawal. Hooker's plan was, as far as he could tell, working perfectly. Hooker sent out orders for his corps to prepare to march the next day. If Lee was in retreat, Hooker would pursue him vigorously.

Hooker discovered that Sedgwick still hadn't moved on the positions at Fredericksburg via communications from Butterfield. At 4:10 p.m. he sent a direct order for Sedgwick to "capture Fredericksburg with everything in it." Sedgwick would still be slow to move, even with this order.

Stonewall's Masterpiece

At 2:30 p.m., Jackson arrived at the point he had chosen to attack Hooker's flank. He had, until this moment, only a vague idea of far right of the Union line. He climbed a hill with Fitzhugh Lee and looked out over Eleventh Corps. He could now see that the point where he had chosen would hit the Federals at an angle, not side on. This wouldn't do, so he decided to move his men another 2 miles around the end of the Union line and hit the Yankees full in the flank. This movement robbed his attack of about two hours of precious daylight.

Though many members of the Eleventh Corps would later write that they had observed Jackson's flank march and warned their superiors to no avail, the only point in which Jackson was observed during his march was at the Catharine Furnace clearing. These observations by men in the Eleventh Corps were mostly of Confederate cavalry covering roads from the prying eyes of Yankee horsemen. The same thing would have been done if the Confederates were in full retreat, so the officers receiving these accounts felt it was consistent with Lee's withdrawal. If Howard had advanced his pickets properly, Jackson would have been detected an hour or more earlier. Instead, the pickets were advanced only about 200 yards. If Pleasanton had been more aggressive with his cavalry, or if he had simply been given more cavalry, Stuart's troopers wouldn't have been able to so easily find the Union army's flank and Jackson's column wouldn't have been able to move unseen.

There were those that did observe Jackson's men as they moved into battle formation after the march had ended. These few sightings were not taken seriously by Howard's staff, or by Brig. Gen. Charles Devens, the division commander on the far right flank of Howard's line. To these generals information flowed down the chain of command, not up. While some exasperated regimental commanders warned their men to be alert, no change in facing was made by the Eleventh Corps. Capt. Julius Dieckmann's battery was on the far right of the Union line. At 4:30 p.m. the picket lines of Col. Leopold Von Gilsa's brigade clashed with those of Rodes' brigade. Dieckmann's artillery fired two shots a piece. This incident was not enough to alert Devens to the threat approaching them, partly due to his nature and partly due to partaking of brandy to dull the pain of a riding injury. Among the frustrated officers who suspected something was up was Dieckmann, who prepared his artillery to move out at a moment's notice.

Jackson formed up Rodes' division into the first line of battle. This took longer than expected due to the strung out nature of the column, the dense woods, and the order that no noise be made during formation. Brig. Gen. George Doles' brigade was south of the Turnpike. To his left, north of the Turnpike, was Brig. Gen. Edward O'Neil's brigade, and on O'Neil's left was the brigade of Brig. Gen. Alfred Iverson. There were 7,800 men in the first line. Two hundred yards back was the second line, with Brig. Gen. Dodson Ramseur's brigade of Rodes' division on the right and then two brigades of Brig. Gen. Raleigh Colston's division: Brig. Gen. Edward Warren's and Brig. Gen. John R. Jones' brigades. The third line was entirely north of the Turnpike. It contained Brig. Gen. Francis Nicholls' brigade of Colston's division, and Brig. Gen. Harry Heth's brigade of A. P. Hill's division. On the Turnpike was Brig. Gen. James Lane's brigade of Hill's division in column formation.

About 1/3 of Jackson's force was not in attack formation. Brig. Gen. Frank Paxton's Stonewall Brigade (Jackson's old brigade) of Colston's division was on the right flank, securing the Orange Plank Road. The three remaining brigades of A. P. Hill's division were too far back to be involved in the attack. The Wilderness precluded the use of Jackson's artillery, so that stayed behind. He had only 8 guns of Stuart's horse artillery on the Turnpike to support his 21,500 men.

Jackson gave Rodes the order to attack at 5:30 p.m., the sun low behind him. They began a fast walk east, through the dense woods.

The Union troops first knew something was wrong when woodland animals began to run from the forest. The troops had been preparing dinner — most of them unarmed with their rifles stacked — as Jackson's corps hit them. As the Southerners burst from they woods, they broke into a fast charge. Dieckmann's artillery retreated without firing a shot, but they would later be caught up on fencing; the guns were left behind and captured. Two of Von Gilsa's German regiments, the 41st New York and 45th New York, turned and ran almost immediately. The two regiments facing west, 54th New York regiment and the 153rd Pennsylvania, held their ground for a few minutes. The New York regiment broke first. The 153rd Pennsylvania, a nine month regiment, stood and fought for a moment, then followed. As the Confederates charged onward, Union regiment after Union regiment broke and ran.

Col. Lee of the 55th Ohio regiment tried twice to get Devens to allow him to change facing from the south to the west. Devens, said to be drunk, refused. Col. Reily of the 75th Ohio (Devens' reserve) changed facing towards the Confederates on his own accord and even moved forward to receive the Confederate charge. His line was broken up by fleeing men. Dole's Georgians and O'Neal's Alabamians overlapped Reily. Stuart's horse artillery fired canister into the Ohioans. Reily was killed, his regiment was swamped, and soon Devens entire line dissolved.

Much the same happened when Jackson's corps hit Schurz's division. Three of his regiments, the 58th New York, 82nd Ohio, and the 26th Wisconsin, turned to face the Confederates at the Hawkins farm but they did little more than slow the advance down for a few minutes before they, too, were swarmed. They at least fell back in good order.

Capt. Hubert Dilger commanding Battery I, 1st Ohio Light Artillery placed his six cannons — 12 lb. Napoleons — on a slight rise near the Plank Road in the vicinity of Wilderness Tavern. His guns slowed the assault. The reserve artillery joined in, firing over the heads of their own men, but they had to stop when they were blocked by fleeing fugitives. Dilger left one gun behind to try and hold the Plank Road and sent the rest to the rear. Capt. Michael Weidrich of the reserve artillery lost two of his pieces when he didn't pull back soon enough. Dilger would keep up a vigorous defense with the remaining gun by firing a shot or two of canister at the Rebels, retreating 50 to 100 yards, and then firing again.

Howard was returning from Third Corps when he was caught in the tide of his own men at Dowdall's Tavern. He tried to rally his troops by grabbing the colours in the stump of his right arm (the arm was lost at the Battle of Seven Pines, where Howard received the Medal of Honor for bravery) and mounting a horse. With the soldiers of Brig. Gen. Adolphus Bushbeck's brigade, and some of Deven's and Schurz's troops, Howard had a line of about 4,000 men. They used shallow rifle pits dug earlier that day, Howard's only real concession to Hooker's order to prepare for an attack from the west. They could only stop the onslaught for little more than half an hour. Howard's men routed from this last desperate line. The Rebels were now less than two miles from the Chancellor House.

All was not perfect with Jackson's assault. Some units were outpacing others. Colston's men started to move up on Rodes'. The two divisions became intermingled. Jackson's line was heavy towards the north. Instead of completely enveloping the Union Eleventh Corps, only the northern portion of Jackson's line succeeded in outflanking the Yankee regiments. Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt's brigade stopped soon after beginning the assault when his men thought they saw Union cavalry on their flank. This was in spite of Rodes' order to keep moving and Paxton's brigade protecting their flank. Cavalry was sent along the Plank Road but no Yankees were spotted. Colquitt resumed the attack. Had he continued without stopping, the number of Eleventh Corps men captured would have been far higher. However, in general, Jackson's assault was going well and the general was pleased.

Hooker found himself in an "acoustic shadow" due to the unique properties of the woods. He and Captains Harry Russell and William Candler of his staff sat on the porch of Chancellor mansion through the early evening. They only heard the occasional boom of artillery, which Hooker put down to Lee's forces to the south. There were few artillery pieces in Jackson's attack since cannons would have been restricted to advancing along roads. The woods were almost perfect for absorbing the sound of musket fire. The first Hooker knew of the assault was at 6:30 p.m. when a commotion down the Plank Road caught Russell's attention. Russell moved down to the road and turned his spy glass in that direction. He then shouted, "My God, here they come!" as the men and oversized baggage train of the Eleventh Corps swarmed into the clearing. Hooker and his staff jumped on horseback and immediately tried to stem the tide of retreating men. This proved futile. All around him men were crying in German, "Alles ist verloren! ("All is lost!")

Hooker called Capt. Clermont Best, the Twelfth Corps artillery chief, to wheel his guns at Fariview around to the west. Hooker took Maj. Gen. Hiram Berry's division of Sickles Corps and ordered him to form a line a half mile west of Chancellorsville and "receive the enemy on your bayonets!" This was Fighting Joe's old division. He also ordered Sickles to bring his force back up to Hazel Grove, and ordered Reynolds to come forward as soon as possible. The order went up to use deadly force to stop the panicked retreat.

Some of the fleeing Eleventh Corps men stopped and joined Berry's division, but most fled. There are reports of men fleeing straight through the lines of Couch's Second Corps and into Confederate lines. Couch stayed where he was, guarding the left flank from Lee. Meade took it upon himself to move to the right of Berry and secure the army's flank with the Rapidan River. Slocum joined up with Berry on the left. Sickles grabbed high ground around Hazel Grove.

Darkness and confusion slowed the Confederate assault. Rodes ordered a halt in order to reorganize his men. Though Jackson had done well, he hadn't made it as far as he wanted. He still planned to link up with Lee that evening. He ordered Rodes men to prepare for a continued attack. It was now 9 p.m.

Friendly Fire

Jackson was sure that the Union line was fragile. With a bright moon night operations were possible. With little thought to his personal safety Jackson took his staff along the Plank Road to probe for a weakness in the union defences. A. P. Hill's party followed. By this point the sun had set and darkness was sweeping over the battlefield. The small group of Confederate officers moved ahead between the battle line of Lane's brigade and their skirmishers. Apparently both Jackson and Hill thought that the other had informed Lane of their position. Neither had, and there was no reason for Lane to believe that the officers were there. Lane's men were preparing to advance, so this scouting movement by Jackson was unnecessary.

Jackson's party was about 150 yards ahead of Lane, Hill's was 50 to 60 yards behind Jackson's. Off to the right there was a single shot, possibly from a Union skirmisher. The 37th and 7th North Carolina regiments of Lane's brigade nervously returned fire. Shots flew through Hill's party and then Jackson's, killing and wounding horses and men. Jackson was not hurt. The two parties headed for the trees at the northern margin of the road for cover, then instinctively headed back to their own lines. At the sound of hoofbeats the 18th North Carolina regiment, in position to repel a suspected cavalry charge, fired at the horsemen. Lt. Joseph Morrison of Jackson's staff, as well as at least one of Hill's aides and Hill himself, tried to get them to cease fire. Maj. John Berry, commanding that section of the line, called out, "Who gave that order? It's a lie! Pour it into them!" They fired.

The firing was halted, but not before Jackson was hit in the lower and upper left arm, and his right hand. His horse, Little Sorrel, wounded and maddened, rushed down the road towards the Union lines. Jackson lost the reigns and was almost knocked from his saddle by a branch. He gained control of the animal with his wounded hand. Two of his aides helped reign in the general's horse. In much pain, he was lowered from his saddle. The bleeding in the upper arm, where an artery was cut, was staunched.

Jackson, fearing he was dying, handed command over to A. P. Hill. Despite old animosities between the two men Hill showed genuine concern for the welfare of his commander. Jackson was moved to a spot where he could be tended by a surgeon. Moments later Morrison, who went forward to see what the Yankees were doing, ran up to the party and told them that the general had to be moved as the Union had brought up an artillery battery a mere 100 yards away. They moved Jackson, first slowly on foot then on a litter. The artillery opened up. The party pressed on until a litter bearer was hit. They waited until the firing slackened, then carried Jackson again. A litter bearer tripped while they carried the litter on their shoulders. Jackson landed on his side and wounded arm. For the first time, Jackson groaned in agony. After about half a mile they met up with an ambulance that took him to the rear of the Confederate lines. His arm was amputated at 2 a.m. on the 3rd of May. On May 5 he was transferred to a small house near Guinea Station, south of Hamilton's Crossing, to recover.

The soldiers of his corps were not told he was hit, just that a "Confederate officer" was down. A soldier recognized him and the word went out anyway.

A. P. Hill commanded the Corps for only a few minutes before he was badly bruised by canister shrapnel from the same Union artillery battery. Unable to walk, he passed command to Rodes. Rodes felt he was too inexperienced to command a corps, and so Hill passed the command over to the only other man in the area with corps command experience, Jeb Stuart. Although a cavalry commander, Stuart was well known and liked by the men of Jackson's corps. He was considered the best choice for maintaining morale and control now that Jackson was down.

Jackson had intended to continue with the assault, but he hadn't shared any specifics about his plan to his subordinates. By the time Stuart assumed command, he could hear the Yankees building breastworks ahead of him. Stuart decided to suspend the attack. He spent the evening learning the situation and reorganizing Jackson's men for the attack against the dug in Federals in the morning.

Around midnight a confused firefight erupted north of Hazel Grove. Sickles was in danger of being cut off at the Hazel Grove clearing. He received permission to attempt a breakout. His plan was to move straight north out of Hazel Grove and towards the Orange Plank Road. Earlier that evening the 8th Pennsylvania Cavalry had followed that same road and was cut up by Confederates. Sickles expected Confederates to his left and maybe in front, with Federals to his right.

Birney's division lead the breakout. The men were moved in parallel lines of companies through the dense woods. The first to fire were the men of Lane's brigade, off to the Yankee left. Sickles men opened fire in response, and against orders. In the deep, dark woods men lost direction. No one could tell friend from foe. Soldiers in the rear of Sickles column fired on their own comrades in front. Sickles had warned Williams of the plan, but not Slocum, William's commander. When many of Birney's troops instinctively shifted right and collided with William's troops, Slocum ordered Best to fire artillery into what he thought was a mass of Confederates. Confederates clashed with Federals. Federals clashed with Federals. The 3rd Michigan managed to reach the Plank Road and capture a battery of guns, only to find that the guns were Slocum's. Berry's division and Brig. Gen. Joseph Knipe's brigade reported repelling charges, but these were most likely made by other Union soldiers.

Sickles retreated back to Hazel Grove. His breakout attempt had suffered 169 casualties, many from friendly fire.

May 3, 1863

(Click on the map for a larger version)

Map 2: The Battle of Chancellorsville – May 3, 1863. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.

Hooker Digs In

The Union army dug in for a defensive battle with the battle line creating an oval around Chancellorsville. Men quickly threw up earthworks in preparation for a Rebel assault.

Sickles' corps held a salient at Hazel Grove. They also held the western and northern faces of the oval. Slocum's corps held the southern face of the oval, and Couch's corps held the eastern face. Two other Corps, the Eleventh and the Fifth, spread out from the top of this oval in a V shape. Howard's Eleventh Corps reformed and rallied. They faced southeast and were anchored on the Rappahannock. Meade's Fifth corps faced southwest. Reynold's corps was on Meade's right flank, linking the army to the Rapidan, facing north west along the Hunting Road.

With the arrival of Reynold's corps, Hooker had some 70,000 men matched up against Lee's 48,000. The Army of the Potomac was still in a strong position. Although his army was badly hurt, Hooker's plan was still pretty much intact. He was still — more or less — on ground of his own choosing. Lee still had to attack him or "ingloriously fly". Surely Stoneman would soon cut Lee's supply line. He also had Sedgwick's corps behind Lee on the Rappahannock. Between his force north of Lee and Sedgwick's to the south, they could catch Lee in a pincer movement.

Sedgwick Crawls Forward

Hooker sent word at 9 p.m. on May 2 for Sedgwick to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg and move on Chancellorsville immediately. The attack on the Eleventh Corps had wrecked the telegraph line to U.S. Ford, so Hooker sent this message by courier. He also sent Brig. Gen. Gouverneur Warren to Sedgwick to impress upon him that Sedgwick was to move aggressively. Hooker needed Sedgwick to fall on Lee's rear, thus cutting his supply lines and forcing Lee to retreat.

After Sedgwick received Hooker's 4:10 p.m. order to attack Fredericksburg, he contented himself with moving Brig. Gen. William "Bully" Brooks' division along the river road. There they contacted the 7th Louisiana, who slowed down Brooks' advance. At the same time Jackson was slamming into the Eleventh Corps, Brooks' men crossed the River Road and bedded down for the night. The divisions of Brig. Gen. Albion Howe and Maj. Gen. John Newton crossed the river to join the rest of the corps.

At 11 p.m., Sedgwick received orders from Hooker to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, break through the Confederate lines, and hit Lee in the rear at dawn of May 3. These orders served only to confuse Sedgwick further (or so Sedgwick stated in testimony after the battle). Hooker thought Sedgwick was still on the wrong side of the river; his information from garbled messages was never corrected by Butterfield, even after Butterfield met Sedgwick earlier on May 2. To take the orders literally, Sedgwick would have to recross the river and assault Fredericksburg directly by laying bridges under fire. This was obviously absurd.

What would have been an easy victory the day before was now much more difficult. Lee had discovered Chilton's mistake and countermarched Early. Early's men were now back in their positions. Instead of dealing with a single brigade, Sedgwick had to deal with a reinforced division. Sedgwick also took Hooker's orders to move through Fredericksburg at face value. He could have moved around the town, but chose to advance up the River Road and through it. He ordered Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's division of Couch's corps, still sitting in reserve at Falmouth, to move across the river. Sixth Corps marched up the River Road with Newton's division in the lead. They encountered skirmishers and grew cautious. Sedgwick informed Butterfield at 1:30 a.m. on May 3 that he would be unable to reach Hooker by daylight.

Sedgwick would not hurry. There were problems with signals, as now Sedgwick was on the other side of the river and the Rebels could read Federal signal codes. This caused him to become even more cautious. It took most of the night for Sedgwick to capture the town. Meanwhile, Gibbon's division moved down to the river and began to cross. They expected to have to cross under fire, but as daylight broke they saw that Sixth Corps had captured the town.

Daylight brought confirmation that Early was back in position. At 6 p.m. on May 2, Sedgwick had 23,600 men opposing a single brigade. Now, at 6 a.m. May 3, Sedgwick was bolstered by Gibbon's 3,500 men, but opposed a dug in force of 8,400 men and 15 guns.

Hooker's Worst Mistake

On the western edge of Hooker's line, trees were felled to make clear lines of fire and three lines of defensive earthworks. The first consisted of abatis (trees chopped down and their branches intertwined to make it hard to cross), the second consisted of a log breastwork 100 yards back. The third line consisted of more felled trees back in a swampy area. The Chancellorsville fieldworks became the most formidable ad hoc fortifications of the war.

Sickles men formed a salient around Hazel Grove, an open hilltop area at the southern portion of the Union line. This position was vulnerable to Confederates from two sides. On the morning of May 3 Hooker saw the position as being too exposed. While it formed an excellent "artillery park", Sickles risked being cut off from the rest of the army. Hooker ordered Sickles back from Hazel Grove to the area of Fairview. Fairview was within the oval defensive perimeter around Chancellorsville.

Stuart formed three lines, with Brig. Gen. Henry Heth's division in the first line (Heth took command of Hill's division after A. P. Hill was wounded), Colston's division in the second line, and Rodes' in the third. At 6 a.m. Stuart ordered forward the brigades of Brig. Gen. Samuel McGowan, Brig. Gen. James Archer (all from Colston's division), Brig. Gen. James Lane, Brig. Gen. William Pender, and Brig. Gen. E. L. Thomas (from Heth's division). Stuart's orders were to assault the Union forces around Chancellorsville and link up with the men directly under Lee. Lee's force was small. He would fight in order to pin down the Yankees in front of him, but could not hold off a determined attack. Lee needed Stuart to be aggressive lest the Yankees split his army in half.

Archer's brigade lost contact with McGowan and wandered into Hazel Grove unexpectedly as the last of Hooker's troops moved out. There was some token resistance from the Federals. Union guns fired canister at Archer's men. The Confederates charged forward, easily capturing the area and 3 guns. They turned left and marched straight down Hazel Grove before encountering the southern most portion of the Union main line. The fire from this defensive line was deadly. Archer's men fell back, advanced again, and fell back again. Brig. Gen. Alexander Porter brought 28 guns into Hazel Grove and began an artillery barrage, hitting the Union line at Fairview with enfilade fire. Soon after he was able to put Fairview in a crossfire with another 14 guns on the Plank Road.

Losing Hazel Grove was Hooker's biggest mistake of the campaign. If Henry Hunt had still been in charge of the artillery he would have seen right away not only it's worth to the Union but its worth to the Confederates. He would undoubtedly have argued strenuously for holding the position. The Federals were able to amass 44 guns at Fairview, but Fairview was much flatter than Hazel Grove. The shots had to be fired over the heads of their own troops using short fuses, a hazardous situation that unnerved the Union infantry. Once the infantry became hotly engaged, the guns had to stop firing at those Confederates and search for new targets.

This is where Hooker's reorganization of the artillery hurt him. Capt. Best, Slocum's artillery chief, commanded the guns at Fairview. However, the guns were under corps and divisional command. The best way to use the guns would have been in a counter battery role. First the guns on the Plank Road would have been silenced, then the guns on Hazel Grove. The Union had enough massed artillery pieces to do this. Hunt had fired his guns en masse the previous summer at Malvern Hill, and would do something similar two months later at Gettysburg. However at Chancellorsville he was relegated to commanding the reserve artillery at Bank's Ford. Capt. Best didn't have the authority to override the orders of the divisional generals, who naturally wanted the artillery to support their own men directly. The artillery continued to fire at infantry targets while Confederate guns fired on Fairview and the Chancellorsville clearing.

Stuart's Assault

The brigades of Lane, Pender, Thomas, and Col. John Brockenbrough (commanding Heth's brigade as Heth was now in divisional command) pushed against the Union line straddling the Plank Road. The line, right to left, consisted of Lane to the south, then Pender, then Thomas, with Brockenbrough's brigade in support.

Lane ran into two regiments of Col. Samuel Moss' Twelfth Corps brigade, pushed them back, and then hit Brig. Gen. Gershom Mott's brigade of Maj. Gen. Hiram Berry's division, Third Corps. Lane's men pushed Mott's brigade back from the earthworks and turned to fire on the now exposed Federal artillery batteries. Their fire mortally wounded Lt. Justin Dimick, whose gun battery had opened fire on the party carrying the wounded Stonewall Jackson.

Pender's brigade pushed against Berry's men. Berry was killed by a Rebel sharpshooter after returning from personally delivering an order to one of his brigades. Pender's men surged forward and turned the right flank of Brig. Gen. William Hays' brigade of Berry's division, managing to capture Hays in the process.

The fighting was bitter. The Federals were well dug in and the casualty toll mounted for the Confederates. Once they approached or crossed the earthworks they took tremendous fire from the Federals. Some have criticized Stuart for his lack of tactical finesse in this battle, but the orders placed upon Stuart and his lack of experience commanding infantry gave him little room to maneuver. In that regard, Stuart performed well with the tools at his disposal.

Farthest north in Heth's divisional line was Thomas' brigade. It pushed within 800 yards of the Chancellor house and threatened to outflank the artillery at Fairview. This was made easier due to a terrible mistake on the Federal side. Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Revere pulled his Excelsior Brigade of New York regiments out of the line. He thought, incorrectly, that after Berry was killed he was the senior brigadier. He took it upon himself to pull out his men for replacement ammunition. This weakened the line dramatically. (Sickles would relieve him of command on the spot and prefer charges against him. A court martial would later order Revere cashiered out, but Lincoln commuted this sentence so that Revere was allowed to resign.)

Hooker was everywhere along the line that morning, moving troops skillfully as needed. He was the Fighting Joe of past battles. He moved Brig. Gen. William H. French's division of Couch's Second corps to check Thomas. French's furious counter attack pushed the entire Confederate line north of the Plank Road back across the breastworks they had captured. Heth's men were moved back to the other side of the log barricade where they had started the morning's assault. French's counter attack then petered out.

Colston was to move his division in behind Heth, but Colston was the least experienced of the divisional generals and took longer to prepare than expected. Brig. Gen. Frank Paxton commanded the Stonewall Brigade, Stonewall Jackson's old command. He started that morning north of the Plank Road but was rushed south to push against the Federal line running between Hazel Grove and the Plank Road. Defending the line was Brig. Gen. Thomas Ruger's brigade of Williams' division, Twelfth Corps.

When the Stonewall Brigade got to the earthworks they found hundreds of Confederates crouched on the outer side. The Stonewall Brigade climbed past these men and made their charge towards the Federals. Ruger's men put up a stiff defense. The brigade was unable to break the Union line, though Paxton was killed in the attempt. The assault was blunted and the Stonewall Brigade pulled back.

Hooker wanted to fight defensively, with strong counter attacks plugging any breakthroughs in the line, and his plan was working. The tide was turning in favour of the Union. Confederate guns at Hazel Grove were slowly destroying Union gun batteries or forcing them to pull out. As the Federal artillery got weaker, more Rebel guns were rushed into Hazel Grove.

At 8:30 a.m. Stuart sent in his last line of troops, that of Robert Rodes' division. The brigades of Alfred Iverson and Edward O'Neal pushed north of the Plank Road, through the woods, and onto the Union barricade. In heavy fighting they backed Couch's men from the barricade and moved forward, exposing the flank of the Union artillery at Fairview.

South of the Plank Road were the Confederate brigades of Brigadier Generals George Doles and Dodson Ramseur. These men tried to take the line of earthworks separating Hazel Grove from Fairview, the line that so far had stopped elements of two Confederate divisions. Ramseur ran his men across the open ground at the double quick. This limited the time they were exposed to the Fairview guns. They collided with Charles Greene's brigade of the Twelfth Corps, replacing Ruger's brigade. A bloody fight ensued.

Slowly, the cartridge boxes of the Federals came up empty, and the Union soldiers gave way. With the artillery outflanked on both sides, there was nothing to do but pull the guns out of Fairview. The climax of the battle was upon Fighting Joe Hooker.

Command Crisis

North of the Plank Road, and — in fact — north of Stuart's men, sat two virtually untouched Union corps, Meade's Fifth and Reynolds First. It was Hooker's stated intention of falling on Jackson's flank (he was still unaware of Jackson's wounding). He told this to General Gouverneur Warren earlier in the day. His men had taken a terrible pounding that morning, but had given at least as good as they got. He had the weight of numbers. A strong counter attack, particularly into the flanks of Stuart's men north of the Plank Road, would turn the battle in favour of the Union, perhaps irrevocably. Meanwhile, he continued to urge Sedgwick forward out of Fredericksburg and towards Chancellorsville.

The Confederates had learned from Union prisoners that Hooker used the Chancellor House as his headquarters. The building became a target for cannons at Hazel Grove. At 9 a.m., or a little after, Hooker was standing on the veranda of the Chancellor house with his hand on a support column. A cannon ball struck the column. Half of the column hit Hooker lengthwise from his head to his feet, crashing him to the porch floor. The word went out that Hooker was killed, but he was only rendered unconscious. He lay there for a time. A doctor was summoned and it was doubted that Hooker would survive, but he defied that prognosis and awoke. He got up and mounted his horse, but then collapsed and vomited, a classic symptom of a severe concussion. He was laid on a blanket for a while and given some brandy. He was soon moved to a safer place. Shortly afterward a shell from Hazel Grove landed on the very same blanket. In the words of Maj. Gen. Abner Doubleday of First Corps, Hooker "suffered great pain and was in a comatose condition for most of the time. His mind was not clear, and they had to wake him up to communicate with him."

Hooker's chief of staff, Dan Butterfield, was in Falmouth. The head of Hooker's staff at Chancellorsville was Brig. Gen. James H. Van Alen, a political general foisted on Hooker by General-in-Chief Henry Halleck. Van Alen would not take the responsibility of passing on the command to Darius Couch, the most senior general on the field. Couch was summoned to headquarters. By the time he got there, shortly after 9:30, Hooker was awake and mounted. Couch congratulated Hooker on his narrow escape and went about his "own business". Hooker collapsed shortly after Couch left.

Dr. Letterman, who treated Hooker, stated that the effects of the general's injury went on for some hours but would not say that he thought Hooker could not exercise command. Van Alen would not pass on the command of the army. It was up to Hooker to do it himself. He summoned Couch once more. Couch arrived at 10 a.m. Hooker handed him command of the army, but with the limitation that he pull back the troops to a position he indicated on a map. Whether or not Hooker was aware of the army's position is open to speculation. That he had a severe concussion can be deduced from the evidence. Short term memory loss is a symptom of severe concussion. Whether Hooker was not in his right mind, or whether he was no longer aware of the situation, he was not in the same mental condition as he was earlier in the day. Hooker would later testify, "I may have been disqualified for command by the accident an hour or an hour and a half," during which time Couch was in command, but was now bound by Hooker's order to pull back.

During this period Sickles had been calling for reinforcements. A strong counter attack, or an assault from the flanking corps to the north, would have countered the gains made by Rodes' division. At the worst possible time Hooker was wounded and the Union command was silenced. After that, it was hamstrung by the orders of a man who should not have been in command.

Around 10 a.m., the Union army began to pull back. Hancock's division of Couch's corps was given the job of guarding the army as it retreated. Lee's troops met up with Stuart's as the Union troops withdrew. The Chancellor house, having come under shell fire, was burning. A fire raged all around the woods surrounding the clearing. Many wounded men who sought shelter in the Wilderness burned to death.

Soon after the Northern men left the area of the Chancellor House, Lee himself rode into the clearing. Here he received a letter from Jackson informing him of the injury. As Lee prepared to aggressively pursue Hooker he received another message. Sedgwick's corps was on the move.

Storming Marye's Heights

At first light on May 3, Sedgwick moved his troops through the town of Fredericksburg in preparation for assaulting Marye's Heights, the same defensive position that badly bloodied the Union army less than 6 months before. He sent forward the division of Maj. Gen. John Newton to probe the enemy's position as the morning fog swirled about. They got within 20 paces of the infamous sunken road when Confederates rose from behind the wall. Newton's troops took musketry and artillery blasts in the face, broke, and ran for the rear where they were quickly rallied.

If Sedgwick had attacked the night before, the heights would have been lightly guarded. Now he had to assault in force. He also had no choice as to how to take the heights. If he tried to outflank the heights, he would simply force Early to drop back in strength towards Chancellorsville. Early would delay Sedgwick all the way. His only chance of success was to hit Early sharply and force him back along a line of retreat away from Lee. What worked in Sedgwick's favour was Early's belief that he was most vulnerable south of the heights. Early had 12,700 infantry and 46 guns to defend 6 miles of front. He had but 1,200 men and 8 guns on Marye's Heights.

Taking the sunken road and the Stone Wall frontally seemed suicidal, but there was little else Sedgwick could do. Attacking the wall from the left flank meant exposing his troops to fire from nearby Lee's Hill. Attempts by Gibbon's men to bridge a canal that guarded the right flank of the hill failed by 9 a.m. that morning. Before the assault a report reached Sedgwick. While under a flag of truce to remove the wounded from Newton's earlier probe, Union soldiers discovered that the Stone Wall was weakly held. Just after 10 a.m., Sedgwick ordered his assault.

The defenders were mostly men of Barksdale's Mississippi brigade and guns from the Washington Artillery of Louisiana. The Federals, due to the cramped nature of the battlefield, assaulted with only Newton's division and Col. Hiram Burnham's Light Division (little more than a brigade in size). The fighting was intense — the Confederates giving better than they got — but the Southerners were pressed from too many sides. The Mississippi men at the wall started to break, and the Union soldiers vaulted over it. As the Rebels retreated the Yankees were in hot pursuit. Many Rebels were killed or wounded before they could even surrender.

Sedgwick prepared his men to move on Chancellorsville. He left Gibbons behind to defend Fredericksburg and the bridges as he didn't know if Gibbons' men were his to command (and Gibbons didn't have the authority to join the march on his own). That gave Sedgwick 22,500 men. Due to the casualties from the earlier assault, Sedgwick took the time to rest Newton's men. He halted the column around noon. Because it was the freshest in the corps, Segwick moved Brig. Gen. William Brooks' division to the front of the column. This took up valuable time.

The Battle of Salem Church

Blocking the way to Chancellorsville was the brigade of Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox, defending a low wooded ridge line that ran at right angles to the Plank Road. On a roadside clearing on the ridge was the brick Salem Church and a wooden school house. Wilcox's men were the only ones in any position to slow down Sedgwick after the Yankees had taken Marye's Heights. His men had seen the storming of Marye's Heights and Wilcox took it upon himself to guard the way to Lee's rear. Lee sent word to Wilcox that the brigades under McLaws would move to reinforce him. Behind Wilcox was a belt of woods where McLaws' men could deploy without being seen. In front of Wilcox was an open area with a toll gate.

Brooks division, at the head of Sedgwick's column, made contact with Wilcox at precisely 3:25 p.m. Brooks was under strength, with a brigade and a number of regiments (almost half his command) in the rear. Brooks spread his men out in front of him in an open area. The 2nd New Jersey acted as skirmishers and 8 other regiments were in a line behind them. Opposite them were 4 of Wilcox's 5 Alabama regiments, with another behind in reserve. However, as the battle was about to start Brig. Gen. Paul Semmes brigade formed on Wilcox's left and the brigades of Brigadier Generals Joseph Kershaw and William Wofford formed in a line on the right. Brig. Gen. William Mahone's brigade of Anderson's division — also sent by Lee — lined up north of Semmes. Brooks had marched into an ambush.

Brooks advanced with two brigades. He soon clashed with the brigades of Semmes and Wilcox. Although McLaws was now on the field, he deferred command to Wilcox. Salem Church and the log schoolhouse became fortresses as the Yankees swept around them. Eventually the buildings were stormed and the Alabamians were captured, but the fighting between the two Union and two Confederate brigades was still fierce. The 121st New York regiment charged straight ahead, routing the 10th Alabama, but the 8th Alabama wheeled part of its regiment around and took the New Yorkers in the flank. Then the 9th Alabama counter charged. The Union line broke and collapsed. The remnants of the Union battle line rallied around the rest of Brooks' men and those of Newton's men just marching into the vicinity of the toll gate.

Click here for a map of the battlefield late on May 3. Brooks' and Newton's divisions were in place, Howe's division was still moving up. McLaws' division stood in front of them, and Anderson's division was still opposite Hooker.

By 7 p.m. Sedgwick found himself near a new crossing at Banks' Ford, three miles from Fredericksburg and 8 miles from Hooker. To the west and south of him were Rebels in unknown strength. He desperately needed direct orders. Instead, he received a dispatch from his friend Gouverneur Warren. Warren had sent the dispatch at midnight but it didn't get to Sedgwick until 6:30 a.m. on May 4. Warren told him that Hooker expected Sedgwick to wait until Hooker's force attacked, and that he was to fall on the bridges at Fredericksburg or the crossing at Banks' Ford if he felt a crossing would be needed. Warren went on to suggest that Banks' Ford was close enough that it could be supported by the main army. Sedgwick now had an idea of what to do.

May 4, 1863

(Click on the map for a larger version)

Map 3: The Battle of Chancellorsville – May 4 to May 6, 1863. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.

Bloodless Recapture of Marye's Heights

The battle on May 3 had been terribly bloody, second only to Antietam. The two armies combined had taken 21,357 casualties. Most of those casualties came around Chancellorsville. Unlike Antietam, where the fighting went on for 12 hours, the fighting around Chancellorsville had lasted only 5 hours.

Hooker spent most of May 3 in periods of deep sleep or fitful restlessness, a by-product of his concussion. By May 4 his faculties were returning. A plan began to coallesce in his mind. He would allow Lee one more day to attack him; his army would stay on the defensive. On May 5, Hooker would strike at a portion of Lee's army. Lee was well known for turning movements and would probably assail the smaller part of Hooker's force. That would be Sedgwick. If Hooker could reinforce Sedgwick with a portion of his main force, he could pin Lee in place with half his army and strike Lee's flank with the other half. For this to work Sedgwick had to hold the pontoon bridges at Banks' Ford.

Lee was planning to do just as Hooker suspected. The previous night he ordered McLaws to prepare to assault Sedgwick. Lee intended to pin down Hooker's main force and deal with Sedgwick directly. Lee was still in a precarious position with a strong Union force sitting to his rear. He started by waging a war of nerves on Hooker. He managed to get a unit of 13 rifled guns to fire on US Ford. The possibility of the Confederates striking anywhere along the Union line left many Federals on edge. The day was quiet... many thought it — to coin a phrase — too quiet. Most of the fighting consisted of skirmishes. The battlefield, though, could still be deadly. Brig. Gen. Amiel W. Whipple, commanding a division in Sickles' Third Corps, was mortally wounded by a sharpshooter.

Jubal Early received a rebuke from Lee for losing Marye's Heights on May 3. Early set about to redress that on the morning of May 4. He assaulted the heights but found that there was no one there. A lead regiment of Brig. Gen. John Gordon's brigade, the 31st Georgia, was able to capture a baggage train. Then they got out in front of the brigade and made contact with Sedgwick's men defending Banks' Ford. Fighting ensued that sucked in the 13th Virginia and the 58th Virginia until they were forced back by a Union counter attack.

Losing Marye's Heights (Gibbons' men were protecting the town and the pontoon bridges) had another effect. All through the campaign the Yankees had heard from Rebel prisoners that Longstreet's men would be arriving soon. In spite of intelligence to the contrary, Sedgwick was of the impression that he was up against a much larger force than his own. Spotting troops on the heights, it occurred to him that Longstreet's corps may be among them. In fact, Longstreet wouldn't be able to extricate himself from the siege of Suffolk until May 5.

Battle for Banks' Ford

Lee spent a good deal of May 4 in a foul, icy mood. He had ordered McLaws to prepare to attack Sedgwick early on the 4th. Not only had McLaws not attacked but he found Sedgwick sitting in a horseshoe shaped position with both ends of his line anchored on the Rappahannock. The Banks' Ford bridges were in his rear. The Confederates spent most of the day moving into position and probing Sedgwick's line. While Lee was angered at the delay, it had a fortunate side effect. When the attack finally came at 5:30 p.m. it was too late for Hooker to help Sedgwick. Hooker had not informed Sedgwick of his intended plans but had indicated that Sedgwick would be supported if heavily attacked. The lack of daylight made that impossible.

The fighting erupted on the left and centre of Sedgwick's battle line. Anderson's three brigades engaged Brooks' division in the centre as a diversion. Early sent the brigades of Brig. Gen. Harry Hays and Brig. Gen. Robert Hoke against the divisional line of Brig. Gen. Albion Howe. Brig. Gen. John Gordon led his brigade to capture Taylor Hill, a hilltop towards the north and near the river. The fighting was hot. The Northerners fell back against the Rebel tide. The 20th New York, a two year regiment made up of New York City's German population, had mutinied earlier in the campaign over their release date. (201 of its men were court martialed and in custody). Their fragile morale collapsed as their commander was wounded in this assault. They broke and ran. This exposed the right flank of Brig. Gen. Thomas Neil's brigade. He pulled back to the second line of defense.

Confusion, fatigue, and dimming light slowed the Confederate rush. General Hoke was wounded, leaving no one who understood that his brigade was to stay in contact with Hays' brigade on the right. A gap opened between the two brigades. Hays lead regiments, due to the speed of their rush, moved well out in front. They took fire from fellow Confederates. As confusion swept over them, both Hoke's and Hays' brigades encountered Col. Lewis Grant's Vermont brigade, known as the Green Mountain Boys. Grant had kept them on the opposite side of a ridgeline. As the Confederates came within range, he ordered the Green Mountain Boys up. They fired a devastating volley into the surprised Confederates. The Confederate assault ended. Darkness settled over the battlefield.

Hooker Retreats – May 4 to May 6

At 11 p.m., May 4, Hooker received a message — with the time of 9:45 — from Sedgwick. It said, "The enemy are pressing me. I am taking position to cross the river whenever necessary." With this, Hooker's chance of striking a flanking blow against Lee was gone. Sedgwick was about to pull across the Rappahannock River. Hooker — stung by Sedgwick's message — gathered his Corps commanders to ask them their opinion, though he had already made up his mind to withdraw the army back across the river. Reynolds, Meade, and Howard wanted to attack. Sickles wanted to withdraw as he felt the safe, political decision was to protect Washington. Couch also sided with Sickles. (Twenty years later Couch would argue that he was for staying on the offensive as long as he could designate the point of attack. He said this was because he had no faith in Hooker. No one at the meeting heard him take such a position.) Slocum didn't arrive until after the meeting was over. Regardless of the vote, Hooker decided to withdraw anyway.

Fate wasn't done playing cruel tricks on Joe Hooker. Sedgwick sent a message to Hooker at around 11:45 stating that he was hemmed in and that it was his intention to withdraw across the river. Brig. Gen. Henry Benham, chief of the army's Engineer Brigade and friend of Sedgwick's, suggested that the decision to pull across the Rappahannock should be Hooker's, that Sedgwick should not pull across without direct orders. Sedgwick sent a second message about 15 minutes later saying he would hold on to the south bank of the river as per his original orders. "Order to withdraw countermanded. Acknowledge..." Hooker received the first message before 1 a.m., May 5. He replied, "Dispatch this moment received. Withdraw. Cover the river and prevent any force crossing." Minutes later Hooker received Sedgwick's second message. It seemed that the battle for Banks' Ford had stabilized and Sedgwick could hold on. Hooker sent a reply message telling Sedgwick to stay on the south bank. Hooker still had a chance to outflank Lee.

Hooker's first message was sent out at 1 a.m. and arrived at Sedgwick's headquarters at 2 a.m. Sedgwick, expecting that his second message would be sent instead of the first, prepared to move his command across the river. He quietly began moving brigades across the bridges. Hooker's second reply took about an hour longer to reach Sedgwick than the first, arriving at 3:20 a.m. By then it was too late. Most of his command was across the river and it would soon be light. By 5 a.m. the corps was on the other side of the river and the bridges were swung across. By 7 a.m. the Sixth Corps was in camp a mile back from the river.

During the night it became apparent to the Confederates that the Union had pulled across Banks' Ford. Sixth Corps would lose 1,454 men captured during the campaign, about two-thirds of these were during the return crossing. Gibbons command at Fredericksburg was ordered back across the river with little incident. Hooker had his engineers prepare a defensive line for the rear guard. He moved the wounded who could stand to be moved back across the river, then he began moving his artillery reserve. The infantry and the rest of the artillery was not scheduled to move until dark.

His rear now safe, Lee turned his attention to Hooker's main army. He moved troops back towards Chancellorsville. He planned — perhaps overconfidently — to strike Hooker that afternoon and destroy his army on this side of the river. Exhaustion slowed the pace of the march. A torrential rain hit in the afternoon, and his troop movements slowed to a crawl. He called off the attack and rescheduled it for the morning of May 6.

That night, in spite of the torrent, the Federal infantry began to move back across the river. Meade's Fifth Corps was the first to move as they were to take position as the rear guard. The rest of the army began to withdraw past them. One of the first across the river was Hooker, an act that those close to him found uncharacteristic. Hooker simply wasn't himself. Ironically, the last unit across the river was Brig. Gen. James Barnes' brigade of the Fifth Corps. They had moved the farthest beyond Chancellorsville on April 30 before being recalled by Hooker.

On the morning of May 6, General Dorsey Pender rode up to Lee with a report that Hooker was back across the Rappahannock. Lee was furious. "This is the way you young men are always doing. You have again let these people get away. I can only tell you what to do, and if you do not do it it will not be done..." Also in the morning of the 6th, Abraham Lincoln sent Hooker some newspaper reports from Richmond with the intention of encouraging the army's commander. The reports were about George Stoneman's raid and how he had caused panic in Richmond. Lincoln didn't know that Hooker was already across the river and that Stoneman had failed miserably in his primary mission.

Stoneman's Raid – May 3 to May 7

So what had happened to Stoneman? On the morning of May 3 Stoneman was 50 miles south of Chancellorsville, not far from Richmond. From his command post at Thompson's Crossroads he sent 400 troopers under Col. Percy Wyndham to do damage to the James River Canal. This was a long term strategic goal, but did nothing to help Hooker.

Stoneman sent another 450 troopers under Col. Judson Kilpatrick to the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac rail road's Hungary Station, less than ten miles from Richmond. They spent most of the day hiding before attacking the next morning. They burned the depot and ripped up rails, but the rails would be relaid in about the same amount of time as it took to wreck it. Kilpatrick then went on to cause some general havoc before escaping to Union lines on the Peninsula on May 6.

The 12th Illinois cavalry under Lt. Col. Hasbrouck Davis reached Ashland, seven miles south of Hanover Junction. There he cut the telegraph, pulled up rails, and burned a trestle so small that it wasn't on the R. F. & P.'s list of bridges. He captured a train of sick and wounded from Fredericksburg, paroled the prisoners, disabled the train, and then went off to do damage to the Virginia Central railroad. Like Kilpatrick, he was behind Union lines on the Peninsula by May 6.

A third party under Brig. Gen. David Gregg also reached Ashland after Davis' men had left. He detailed 200 men to burn the bridge across the South Anna River, but they were chased off by the bridge's guard and Gregg didn't try a second time.

On May 5, Stoneman headed back to the Army of the Potomac. He had been shadowed by the cavalry brigade of Brig. Gen. Rooney Lee, Robert E. Lee's son. The younger Lee had expected Stoneman to head north, but instead Stoneman had doubled back on his tracks. Word was sent to Jeb Stuart to watch out for Stoneman. Stuart organized an ambush at Verdiersville on the Orange Plank Road for the morning of May 7, but Stoneman had marched through the town the previous night. By nightfall on May 7, Stoneman had reached Kelly's Ford, and the next morning he recrossed the river.

Northern papers were full of praise for Stoneman because he had damaged the Confederacy so close to its capital. His raid had caused panic in Richmond but no lasting effects. Damage to the R. F. & P. was repaired within 48 hours, and the Virginia Central was back in business by May 8. Stoneman's raid was inept. The main target should have been Hanover Junction. Supplies from Richmond were warehoused there prior to shipment to Lee's army. Just north of the town was the bridge over the North Anna River. Destroying this would have cut Lee's supply line. Lee would have had to retreat from Chancellorsville before he ran out of food and ammunition. Instead, observers dutifully recorded two or three trains arriving at Hamilton's Crossing, just south of Fredericksburg, every day of the campaign. Stoneman had been implored to "fight, fight, fight", but from his command of 7,400 men he had lost only 200; about 3/4 of these were due to straggling.

© 2009 Allan Goodall
Original design by Andreas Viklund