The Bloodiest Day – The Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), September 17, 1862
Initial Dispositions
Jackson commanded the northern flank and Longstreet held the southern flank. The battle line was some four miles long roughly parallel to the Hagerstown turnpike. Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade of cavalry linked Jackson's left flank to the Potomac River. Positioned on the modest Nicodemus Hill was Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery and three batteries of regular artillery. Col. Thomas Munford's cavalry protected Longstreet's right flank by guarding the lower Antietam where it entered the Potomac. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia numbered about 35,000 men and 200 pieces of artillery. This included McLaws and A. P. Hill who weren't with Lee on the 16th of September. On that day Lee had less than 26,500 with him. Much of the army had straggled away; it would only be this small again in the final weeks of the war.
The Army of the Potomac had only a vague, and inaccurate, idea of Lee's strength. Hooker thought Lee had 50,000 men. Sumner thought the Rebels had 80,000. Porter's chief-of-staff put the total at 100,000 to 130,000. McClellan himself believed the actual number was close to 100,000. The terrain could hide that large an army but McClellan had done little reconnaissance.
Hooker's First Corps was on the far right (north) of the Union line. Maj. Gen. Joseph Mansfield had been called up from Washington to command the Twelfth Corps. McClellan ordered the First Corps across the northern portion of the Antietam late on the 16th in preparation for the next day's battle. When Hooker complained that he would be eaten up, McClellan sent Mansfield's Twelfth Corps in support, with Sumner's Second Corps held back on the eastern side of the creek in reserve to aid Hooker if and when he needed it. In spite of recently being in charge of an entire wing of the army, Sumner would be subordinate to Hooker once the battle commenced, a deliberate slight devised by McClellan.
At the far left of the Union line was Burnside's Eleventh Corps. Until South Mountain Sumner, Franklin and Burnside each commanded a "wing" of he army. This arrangement was dissolved prior to Antietam with no explanation to the generals in question. This rankled Burnside who was asked by McClellan to account for his mistakes during the moving of troops off South Mountain. Cox had assumed command of Ninth Corps, but offered to step down in favour of Burnside. Burnside would have nothing of it as it would serve to show he accepted the slight to his honour. So, while McClellan sent orders directly to Hooker, Ninth Corps orders went to Burnside who did little more than forward them on to Cox.
In the centre of the Union line was Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter's Fifth Corps. Along side it was Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasanton's 4,300 man cavalry division. The Fifth Corps and the cavalry formed a general reserve force. McClellan actually envisioned ordering a Napoleonic style cavalry charge sometime during the battle. By holding the cavalry in the centre of the line, though, he prevented them from conducting scouting missions. McClellan was going into the battle partially blind due to his failure to use the cavalry effectively.
At 7:30 p.m. on the 16th, McClellan finally ordered Franklin out of Pleasant Valley. His Ninth Corps would join Porter in the reserve. The Union army had 94,000 men, but its effective strength was only about 71,500, with 300 artillery pieces. Another division of Porter's corps with 6,600 men was 23 miles away in Frederick.
McClellan's plan for the next day's battle was to assault the Confederates in their left flank with his right flank. He also intended to force a crossing at the Rohrbach Bridge in front of Burnside, but whether this was to be at the same time as the assault in the north or whether it was to come later, and whether this was a diversion or a full scale attack, was never clearly stated. At any rate, McClellan's corps commanders did little to find out what was before them. This included Burnside who did not investigate reports by locals that there was a usable ford downstream from the Rohrbach Bridge. Burnside merely trusted McClellan's engineers that there was a usable ford downstream of him and that it would be suitable for use by a flanking force.
It wasn't until around 4 p.m. on the 16th that McClellan sent Hooker's First Corps across the Antietam at the Upper Bridge area. Jeb Stuart's cavalry witnessed the crossing and warned Lee. Lee rushed Hood's division over to meet the threat. The lead elements of Hooker's corps were in Brig. Gen. George Meade's division. They clashed with Hood's men. Artillery joined in but the sharp fight was over fairly quickly when the sun went down. Mansfield's Twelfth Corps followed Hooker just before midnight. McClellan ordered the troops not to light fires out of a need for secrecy.
There was no point in secrecy. The only element of surprise in McClellan's battle plan was already lost. Lee moved troops to his left flank, strengthening it. Instead of a flank attack, Hooker would be making a frontal assault.
Hood asked that his men be pulled out of the line to cook a hot meal. Lee pulled two of Hood's brigades back in reserve and moved in two other brigades. Hood was ordered to move his men up the moment they were called for.
Both sides settled in restlessly, knowing that the morning would bring on a big fight.
Hooker's Assault
Map 1: Hooker's assault – 6 a.m. to 7:30 a.m. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.
Two brigades of Meade's division of Hooker's corps were formed up in a wood lot known as the North Woods, their right flank starting on the east side of the Hagerstown Turnpike. A mile south was Hooker's objective, a raised plateau with a small white washed building on it. The building was a church of the pacifist German Baptist Brethren Christian sect. It lacked a steeple because the sect believed that such a thing was too ostentatious. They also believed in total immersion baptism, so they came to be known as the Dunkers. South of the North Woods was the the cornfield of David Miller, an area that would come to be known after that day simply as "the Cornfield". The division of Brig. Gen. James Ricketts was to advance through the Cornfield to assault the Dunker Church area. The wooded area west of the Dunker Church came to be known as the West Woods. The division of Brig. Gen. John Hatch — now under Brig. Gen. Abner Doubleday since Hatch was wounded at Turner's Gap — would advance south along the Hagerstown Turnpike through the Miller farm towards the West Woods.
Jackson's Confederates defended the Dunker Church plateau. A quarter mile north and just west of the church, in and near the North Woods, sat the division of Brig. Gen. John R. Jones. Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton's division had one brigade on the southern edge of the Cornfield and another brigade in line and further on the right on the farmland of Samuel Mumma. Lawton's two other brigades and Hood's division were in reserve in the southern portion of the West Woods. Four artillery batteries from Col. Stephen D. Lee's artillery battalion were on the plateau near the church, with clear lines of fire north and east.
It's not known just how much initiative was given to Joe Hooker, so it's not clear whether the two worst mistakes on this part of the battlefield were his or McClellan's. A key piece of terrain was Nicodemus Hill, north of the West Woods and west of he North Woods. Maj. John Pelham of Stuart's Confederate cavalry had 14 guns on the hill, ready to hit the Yankees in the flank when they advanced. If the Yankees had taken the hill they could have conducted enfilade fire against the Rebel line. Lee sent only a single brigade to defend the hill, but no attempt to take it was conducted. The guns on the hill raked the Union line all during the assaults with only counter-battery fire harassing the Rebels.
The second mistake was the failure to use Mansfield's Twelfth Corps. It sat about a mile behind and to the east of Hooker. No effort was made at a simultaneous assault with both the First Corps and the Twelfth Corps. As a result Hooker's 8,600 men attacked Jackson's 7,700 all by themselves.
The battle opened at dawn with Stuart's and Doubleday's artillery firing at each other. Four batteries of Confederate Col. Stephen Lee's artillery battalion near the Dunker Church plateau joined in, as did the heavy 20 lb. rifled Parrott guns from McClellan's reserve artillery on the other side of the Antietam.
Meade's remaining brigade — under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour — was in the East Woods, the area of the previous night's firefight. They advanced through the woods, clearing out Rebel sharpshooters, until they got to the wood's edge at the Smoketown Road. There they engaged Isaac Trimble's brigade under Col. James Walker. Trimble's men eventually drove back the Yankees.
As the fight in East Woods developed, Hooker advanced Ricketts' division. These men began to take artillery fire as soon as they left the cover of the North Woods. Union guns fired back and some guns were moved up to the north edge of the Cornfield as Ricketts' men formed a battle line.
Rickett's lead brigade was that of Brig. Gen. Adam Duryea. His 1,100 men marched into the corn, their bayonets gleaming above the stalks. Waiting for them was Lawton's brigade under Col. Marcellus Douglass. The Rebels were lying on the ground; when Duryea's Yankees appeared they rose up and fired into them. Both lines stood in the open blazing away at each other. After some terrible fighting both sides dropped down for cover almost simultaneously. Trimble's men moved to take the Yankees in the Cornfield in their left flank but they were shot at by Seymour's men still in the East Woods. Duryea's troops were running low on ammunition and had suffered fearful losses. With no sign of reinforcements, Duryea pulled his brigade back through the corn in good order. In half an hour he had lost almost a third of his men.
Ricketts had intended for his other two brigades, under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christian, to advance in close support of Duryea. It didn't work out that way. Hartsuff was reconnoitering up front when a shell fragment wounded him. His confused brigade didn't continue the advance until Duryea had already been forced back. As Christian's brigade approached the East Woods they came under shell fire. Christian started to lose his nerve. He had his men drill back and forth unnecessarily as they advanced. Finally he could take no more. He jumped off his horse and ran for the rear. The brigade was useless while they tried to sort themselves out. (Christian would resign his commission two days after the battle.)
Hartsuff's brigade — now under Col. Richard Coulter — finally emerged from the East Woods and the Cornfield into heavy Rebel musket fire while the guns on Nicodemus Hill had the Yankee's range. In spite of their heavy fire, the Rebels in this part of the field were mostly spent. To shore up the defences Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton rushed in the famous Louisiana Tigers brigade under Brig. Gen. Harry T. Hays. The charge of the Tigers, plus some of Col. Douglass' Georgians, drove Coulter's men back into the corn and to the fringe of the woods. There Coulter stood his ground.
Captain James Thompson pushed his artillery battery onto a hillock in the cornfield and fired on the Confederates. The Louisianians and Georgians were caught in a crossfire and Doulgass was killed. The Confederates drifted back to the safety of the hollows and outcroppings in the pasture where they continued to pour fire on the Yankees. Coulter's men also took casualties from Confederate case shot and solid shot fired from the guns near the Dunker Church. At 7 a.m. Christian's brigade, now under Col. Peter Lyle, moved up and relieved Coulter. The fighting continued but for now a stalemate settled over this part of the battlefield. The 12th Massachusetts regiment of Coulter's brigade lost 224 out of 334 men killed, missing and wounded. This casualty rate of 67% was nearly matched by the Louisiana Tigers, who lost 61%.
On Hooker's right flank, Doubleday's division advanced in the area of the Hagerstown turnpike. In the lead was the Black Hat Brigade (later known as the Iron Brigade) of Brig. Gen. John Gibbon. They pushed the Rebels out of Miller's orchard and advanced astride the turnpike. They entered the Cornfield at the same time as Hartsuff's brigade (under Col. Coulter) off to their left. Close behind Gibbon in support were the brigades of Col. Walter Phelps, Jr. and Brig. Gen. Marsena R. Patrick. A two gun section of Battery B, 4th U.S. artillery moved up to a supporting position west of the turnpike, near Miller's barn.
Gibbon's lead regiment was the 6th Wisconsin. They sent out skirmishers to protect Gibbon's right flank. In the smoke they were mistaken for the enemy and fired on by their own men. This sent the skirmishers running and exposed the flank. Soon after, this flank was hit by two brigades of Virginians in the West Woods. The Virginians were from Brig. Gen. William E. Starke's division. The two brigades were combined under the command of Col. Andrew Grigsby of the famous Stonewall Brigade, Jackson's old command.
Gibbon moved the 7th Wisconsin and the 19th Indiana to the fields west of the turnpike while Patrick moved up his brigade. Their steady fire pushed the Virginians back into the woods, eventually reducing the two Confederate brigades to just 250 men. The Yankees had a foot hold in the West Woods.
With pressure on his flank relieved, Gibbon sent the 6th Wisconsin, the 7th Wisconsin and Phelp's brigade through the Cornfield. They met the same horrible volleys as Duryea half an hour before. Off to their left, Hartsuff's men were fighting the Louisiana Tigers. Gibbon pressed hard and the Georgians began to give way.
Another Confederate battle line came out of the West Woods. This line was composed of the last two brigades of Starke's division led by Starke himself. The line charged the Federals, halting Doubleday's advance, but like the Louisiana Tigers they were caught in a murderous crossfire. They were shot at from the pasture west of the turnpike and from the Cornfield. They were hit in the flank and rear by Yankees in the West Woods. Battery B dropped case shot on them. Starke was mortally wounded. The battle line pulled back to the West Woods.
The battle was going Hooker's way, yet McClellan still hadn't sent orders to Mansfield, Sumner near the army's headquarters, or Burnside on the left flank. Robert E. Lee saw the lack of action on his right flank. At 7:15 a.m. he ordered the division of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson of Longstreet's command to move from the right flank over to help Jackson on the left.
At about 6:30 a.m. the wounded Brig. Gen. Alexander Lawton, commanding Confederate Brig. Gen. Richard Ewell's division after Ewell was wounded at 2nd Manassas, asked Brig. Gen. John Bell Hood — of Longstreet's command — to come to his aid. Hood's men had engaged Meade's the previous night and were now in the reserve trying to get something to eat. The commissary wagons were late. When they did arrive all they had was flour. The men were cooking hoecakes when the call came to form up. They ate what they could of the partly cooked dough as they formed a battle line.
Hood's division of 2,300 moved out of the West Woods around 7 a.m., crossed the turnpike, and entered the pasture south of the Cornfield. They paused to let Lawton's men past, then they let loose with a deadly volley. Hood formed a line from the turnpike to the East Woods and ordered a general advance. They pushed the Yankees back into the Cornfield. On their right, Hood's division hit Christian's brigade in the East Woods, the last of Rickett's division still on the field. The sight of the Rebels seemed to unnerve the officers and three of the four regiments fell back. Only the 90th Pennsylvania held out until sheer weight of numbers forced it back, too. Rickett had lost 1/3 of his men.
Hooker finally called for support from Mansfield, then he threw in his last reserves — two brigades of Meade's division — and moved up the last of Battery B's guns. Once more there was slaughter in the Cornfield.
Three regiments of Col. Evander Laws' brigade of Hood's division pushed through the eastern part of the Cornfield, finally coming to the rail fence at the north end of the field. There they fired into the flank of Col. Albert L. Magilton's brigade of Meade's division as it rushed to stem the tide of fleeing Federals in the East Woods. The two regiments in the centre of the brigade broke, but the other two held. Law's Mississippians hopped the fence and moved into the open. They shot at the Pennsylvanians and Federal artillery. The artillery returned fire with double canister rounds, but unsupported artillerymen couldn't hold on for long. Two batteries were silenced and a third was driven off before it could unlimber.
On Hood's left three regiments of Col. William Wofford's brigade, the 18th Georgia, 4th Texas, and Hampton's Legion, faced due west. They engaged Patrick's and Gibbon's brigades as well as Battery B. Some remnants of Starke's men rushed along the western side of the turnpike and fired on Battery B. Fourteen artillerymen fell. The battery's other four 12 lb Napoleons moved up and fired canister into the Confederates. Hood's men continued to advance. The battery switched to double canister. Nothing but battle flags could be seen through the thick smoke. The carnage was awful and Hood's assault petered out.
The 1st Texas, also of Wofford's brigade, recklessly pursued fleeing Federals to within 30 yards of the Cornfield's northern fence, 150 yards ahead of the rest of the brigade. Col. Robert Anderson's brigade of Meade's division was waiting. With their guns resting on the rail fence they fired when they saw the Texans' legs below the smoke. Shot from three sides by deadly infantry volleys and canister fire, the 1st Texas was destroyed losing four out of five men killed or wounded in about 20 minutes.
Hood's attack receded, leaving only a foothold in the East Woods. Hooker's and Jackson's corps had smashed against each other and were now wrecked except for one brigade each, which they had kept in reserve. It was about 7:30 a.m.
Mansfield Finally Advances
Map 2: Twelfth and Second Corps advance – 7:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.
Brig. Gen. Joseph Mansfield, whose corps was behind Hooker by about a mile, now advanced. Mansfield was an engineer, having served in the army for 40 years. He fought in the Mexican War, earning three brevets, and eventually became inspector general of the U.S. Army. Mansfield never had a combat command during his career, so he petitioned Washington for such a command. He received it, taking over Twelfth Corps on September 15. This made him the oldest general in the Army of the Potomac.
Twelfth Corps had been inching forward from the moment Hooker's First Corps engaged the Confederates. The corps would shamble forward a few hundred yards and then halt for a while, the process repeating several times. Mansfield went ahead for orders from Hooker. When he returned he found his officers had changed to battle line formation. Mansfield countermanded the order and had them return to a dense column formation. Alpheus Williams, the commander of the corps until Mansfield had taken over, pleaded that column march made the troops too vulnerable to artillery. Mansfield, with his regular army distrust of volunteer troops, discarded this argument. He believed that columns were necessary to control the men.
Hooker's plan was to have Mansfield's corps line up in an arc behind First Corps, from the turnpike to the East Woods. Moving the corps was a problem. Several regiments were new and close to full strength. This made them two to three times the size of veteran regiments. Unfortunately they were so new that they had little experience drilling. Williams personally directed the 124th Pennsylvania of Brig. Gen. Samuel Crawford's lead brigade to the turnpike, while Mansfield lead the 125th Pennsylvania and the 10th Maine to the East Woods. The sight of the huge 125th Pennsylvania was enough to send the rest of Hood's men packing from the eastern portion of the Cornfield, thinking that a full brigade was advancing.
The commander of the 10th Maine had the presence of mind to change the regiment's formation to battle line once the general was gone. The regiment soon took fire from remnants of Hood's men and the Georgians in the East Woods, who were fighting Indian-style in the difficult terrain. When Mansfield returned leading the 128th Pennsylvania, he thought the 10th Maine was firing on Federal troops. Mansfield tried to stop them but soldiers in the regiment protested. Some Rebels could be seen pointing rifles at them, and Mansfield realized too late that his men were right. A bullet hit him in the chest. He managed to dismount and lead his horse to the rear before collapsing. He was taken to a field hospital and died the next day, having led the corps for only two days. Williams was back in command.
Mansfield had directed the 128th to form a line from the pasture north of the Cornfield to the East Woods. When they did they were fired on by Confederates in the south edge of the Cornfield. Those Confederates were from Brig. Gen. Roswell Ripley's brigade of D. H. Hill's division. Hill was posted to the centre of the Confederate line, but he sent Ripley's brigade to reinforce Hood when Hood started his assault. Ripley arrived just as Hood's men fell back through the Cornfield.
The 128th Pennsylvania regiment was green. When it took fire while deploying, the men of the regiment moved about in confusion. Officers and NCOs of neighbouring regiments moved in and threw them into some semblance of order. Col. Knipe of the 46th Pennsylvania believed that the best way to preserve order was to send the regiment on an assault. He said as much to the 128th Pennsylvania's major, who ordered the regiment forward. They charged into the Cornfield. As they reached the south edge of the field they were cut down by Ripley's brigade.
Under Hooker's orders, Williams sent the brigade of Col. William B. Goodrich to shore up Gibbon's men near the West Woods. He sent Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon's brigade into the centre of Hooker's line, through the Cornfield, and into contact with Ripley's brigade. On the Confederate side, Hill weakened the Rebel centre by sending Brig. Gen. Alfred Colquitt's brigade into the Cornfield to reinforce Ripley. He also sent Garland's brigade, under the command of Col. D. K. McRae since Garland's death on South Mountain, to shore up the flank in the East Woods. The Yankees in the Cornfield fell back north but did not break.
Garland's brigade, now McRae's, still hadn't recovered from its experience at Fox's Gap. When the 28th Pennsylvania — another full strength regiment, with 800 men — angled towards the brigade's right flank, the brigade panicked. The 5th North Carolina broke first, followed by the rest of the brigade.
The 28th Pennsylvania regiment was part of Lt. Col. Hector Tyndale's brigade of Brig. Gen. George S. Greene's division. Tyndale's brigade swung through the woods and faced almost due west. There, 30 yards away, was Colquitt's brigade along the fence marking the Cornfield's northern boundary. The Federals fired into the Rebel's flank with deadly effect, and then charged into the field. Nasty hand-to-hand fighting took its toll and Colquitt's men broke. More than half of Colquitt's men, and all of his field officers, were casualties. Hill managed to pull the remnants of Ripley's brigade to the West Woods, but Colquitt's brigade was shattered.
Greene sent Col. Henry J. Stainrook's brigade through the East Woods, sweeping the last of the Texans and Georgians before it. Greene then pushed his brigade up to within 200 yards of the Dunker Church.
At 7 a.m., when Hood made his assault, Jackson requested reinforcements from Robert E. Lee. Lee sent for Brig. Gen. John G. Walker's and Brig. Gen. Lafayette McLaw's divisions of Longstreet's corps. By about 9 a.m. McLaws was still 3/4 of a mile from Jackson's tenuous battle line. There were a total of 8,000 men dead or wounded on the field, about equally spread between Yankees and Rebels.
Hooker had been among the troops all day, keeping up with the flow of the battle and urging on his men. He was near the Federal line before the Dunker Church when a Confederate sharpshooter shot him in the foot. As he weakened from loss of blood, he was forced to leave the field. He thought the Army of the Potomac was poised to destroy the Army of Northern Virginia.
The Second Corps Advances
Maj. Gen. Edwin Vose Sumner was an experienced officer but not a particularly gifted one. Nicknamed "Bull" for his booming voice (and "Bull Head" behind his back for his stubborn, know-it-all streak), he was second only to Mansfield in age. Sumner was in charge of the largest corps in the Army of the Potomac but McClellan didn't trust Sumner's command abilities. When Hooker crossed the Antietam the night before, Sumner's corps was held back even though Sumner was supposed to be in charge of a wing of the army, comprising both the Second and Twelfth Corps. On the morning of the battle McClellan kept Sumner in the dark as to the progress of the battle until the Second Corps was ordered forward at 7:20 a.m.
For his part, Sumner disagreed with Little Mac's handling of the battle. He thought Second Corps should have been ordered to charge in with the rest of Hooker's command. He was direct and none too subtle, and in this case he happened to be right. Unfortunately being right wasn't enough.
Instead of following Hooker's route across the Antietam Sumner crossed at a ford opposite the Dunker Church, which took less time. His corps had three divisions under Maj. Gen. Israel Richardson, Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick, and Brig. Gen. William French. Sedgwick was in the lead. Richardson's division was held back in reserve by McClellan and wouldn't be released until 9:00 a.m when it was replaced by Maj. Gen. George Morrell's division of Porter's Fifth Corps. French's division, 20 minutes behind Sedgwick, lost track of the lead division and ended up angling southwest to the centre of the Confederate line. Sumner now had only a single division with him, though he didn't know that yet.
Sumner arrived in the East Woods as Hooker, semi-conscious from his wound, was pulled off the field. Sumner was now the ranking general in command of that part of the battlefield. Alpheus Williams came forward to appraise him of the Twelfth Corps' dispositions. Williams' corps was spread out from the East Woods to the West Woods, effectively out of centralized control. All that remained of First Corps on the front lines were Patrick's and Gibbon's brigades; the rest of Hooker's corps was off to the north, spent. Twelfth Corps held the Union line. Greene, in the area of the Dunker Church, called for ammunition and warned that the Rebels were active in the West Woods. Sumner took very little of this in and brushed off Williams. He came to the conclusion that both I and Twelfth corps were totally used up and pushed off the field. He also concluded that the Twelfth Corps men lying in the pasture just west of the East Woods marked the far flank of the Union army. He formulated a plan to charge forward through the West Woods and then angle south once they cleared the woods. In his mind Sumner figured they would fall on the Confederate flank and drive the Army of Northern Virginia into the clutches of Porter's Fifth Corps or Burnside's Ninth Corps.
Sedgwick's brigades were laid out in three parallel lines facing west. The lines were 500 yards long and 50 yards apart, a dense formation aptly prepared for any Confederates that would appear in front of them. The lead brigade was commanded by Brig. Gen. Willis A. Gorman. The second brigade in line was under Brig. Gen. Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana. The trailing brigade was that of Brig. Gen. Oliver Otis Howard. Sedgwick's division headed out for the West Woods.
The compact formation made an ideal target for artillery as the division came to the woods. The division pushed forward and Gorman's brigade came out the other side of the woods. It took more artillery fire as Gorman continued forward. Then, without warning, the men of the Stonewall Brigade (under Col. Andrew J. Grigsby) fired on Gorman from in front and off to the left. At about this time, the Confederate brigade of Col. George Tige Anderson (of Jones' division, Longstreet's corps) and McLaws' division (also of Longstreet's corps) were rushed into place in the West Woods by Stonewall Jackson. Jackson was eager to exploit the Union's horrible mistake.
McLaws men joined in the fighting. At first the Federals hung on bravely, but then the brigades of Brig. Gen. Jubal Early and George Anderson added their weight of fire. Sedgwick's troops took a horrible fire from in front and the flank, made all the worse because it was unexpected. Regiments tried to deploy to defend against the threat to the left, but there wasn't enough room between the brigades to properly maneuver. Regiments became hopelessly entangled.
At first Sumner didn't realize the extent of his predicament. He was forward with Gorman's brigade when he heard the clatter of musketry from behind. Personally brave and inspirational, he rode among his men in an attempt to retreat them out of the trap. Hundreds of Yankees streamed off to the north and east. Those that didn't run withstood a withering fire. Within about 10 minutes Howard's brigade alone suffered 550 casualties. A single New York regiment lost over 180 men. Many Yankees escaped east to the pasture south of the Cornfield, pursued by Rebels. The six guns from Battery I, 1st U.S. Artillery helped stem the pursuit by firing canister into the pursuing Confederates.
The brigade of Brig. Gen. Paul Semmes and 19 guns under Jeb Stuart moved to outflank the Yankees. This was too much for Sedgwick's division. It finally splintered altogether and fled for the North Woods. With it went the I and Twelfth Corps men who had stood in the West Woods. A makeshift line of First Corps troops and artillery finally stopped the Confederates, who dropped back to the West Woods for ammunition. The Union lost 2,300 men to about a thousand Confederates.
The Confederates continued to counterattack. The brigade of Brig. Gen. Joseph Kershaw (McLaw's division) assaulted Greene's men near the Dunker Church after helping to clear the West Woods. Greene, recently resupplied and reinforced by a Rhode Island artillery battery, repulsed them. At 9:45 a.m. Alpheus Williams received a call for reinforcements. He sent the 2nd Massachusetts and the 13th New Jersey west through the Cornfield. When they got to the turnpike they were hit by the brigade of Brig. Gen. Robert Ransom and forced back. Ransom was part of Brig. Gen. John G. Walker's division. Walker, in Longstreet's corps, had been on the far right of the Confederate line until Lee sent him orders an hour earlier to reinforce Jackson. The brigade of Col. Van Manning, also of Walker's division, assaulted Greene at 10 a.m. Greene's Yankees were concealed behind the rim of the Dunker church plateau. They opened fire on the Rebels at 70 yards. Manning was seriously wounded and his brigade was slaughtered. Greene pushed his battle line 200 yards west of the church and then called for further reinforcements. Once again, the Union had a foothold in the West Woods.
French Assaults Bloody Lane
Map 3: The Assault on Bloody Lane – 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.
Six hundred yards south of the Dunker Church was a small farm road. This road ran east from the Hagerstown turnpike, bent southeast, then ran south in a zigzag until it met the Boonsboro turnpike between Sharpsburg and the Antietam. Due to heavy traffic and erosion, the road was below the level of the surrounding terrain. This turned the road into a natural trench line. It was known as the Sunken Road, but after the battle it would be better known as Bloody Lane.
Maj. Gen. Daniel Harvey Hill's division sat in this sector. He placed Brig. Gen. Robert E. Rodes' brigade in the section of the road running east, with the brigade of Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson beside Rodes in the section that ran southeast. The remnants of Colquitt's and Garland's brigades were put into the line to the left of Rodes. Cobb's brigade was also added to the defences. All told there were about 2,500 Rebels in the Sunken Road.
At 9:30 a.m., the 5,700 men of Union Brig. Gen. William French's division (of Sumner's Second Corps) angled south from the vicinity of the East Woods and headed for the sunken road. As mentioned previously, French had lost track of Sedgwick's division when he came to the East Woods. He received an order from Sumner to press his attack. He looked around, saw Twelfth Corps troops to his left that looked like they could use his help, and headed that way.
French marched across the fields of farmer Samuel Mumma and through the pasture and apple orchard of farmer William Roulette. He pushed Confederate skirmishers out of the way and his surgeons took over Roulette's barn as a field hospital. Beyond the Roulette barn, the ground rose up steadily to a ridge that crested parallel to the Sunken Road. The ridge offered the only protection against musket fire. It also meant that any troops crossing the ridge would be visible against the sky.
In the lead was the brigade of Brig. Gen. Max Weber. On the right of the brigade's line was the 4th Delaware regiment, with the 5th Maryland in the centre and the 4th New York on the left. As they neared the crest of the ridge they were given the order to fix bayonets and charge. Waiting for them was Rodes' brigade. The Confederates fired at a range of about 80 yards. The 4th New York lost 150 men in the initial volley. In five minutes the brigade suffered 450 casualties. The Yankees retreated back to the crest of the ridge where they laid down and fired back.
Col. Dwight Morris' brigade followed Weber's. This consisted of the 14th Connecticut, 108th New York, and the 130th Pennsylvania regiments, which had been in the army for about a month. Confusion set in as they started to take casualties, and the rookie regiments began firing at their own men. The 1st Delaware of Weber's brigade was caught in a crossfire with the Rebels in front and the 14th Connecticut behind. Some of the Delaware troops broke and ran for the relative safety of a cornfield back behind the ridge, going through the Connecticut regiment and taking some of them with them as they went. The other regiments in the brigade crested the ridge and fired on the Confederates.
Some of Anderson's men leaped over the rail fence breastworks that protected the lip of the Sunken Road and charged at the Union men, only to be driven back. Longstreet thought these charges were a sign of disorder and ordered a charge of his own. Rodes men on the left of his line counterattacked on the grassy slope, but they were cut down by Yankee musket fire and enfilading artillery fire. They fell back with heavy losses.
French sent in his last brigade, that of Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball. Kimball's brigade consisted of the veteran 8th Ohio, 14th Indiana and 7th West Virginia regiments, as well as the new 132nd Pennsylvania regiment. They charged at the double-quick with bayonets fixed. They were cut down by Rebel musketry.
By 10:30 a.m. French had 1,750 casualties, the worst loss of any division except for Sedgwick's. His men were spent as an assault force, but they still lay behind the ridge line, firing at the Rebels.
Lee moved the reserve division of Maj. Gen. Richard Anderson up to support the Sunken Road position. The Confederates also moved every available gun into the area between the West Woods and Sharpsburg. These guns drew fire from the Union artillery across the Antietam and Tompkins' artillery about a quarter mile behind the ridge. The Union gunners couldn't easily fire into the Sunken Road without the risk of hitting their own troops, but they could safely hit the Confederate artillery moving in from the rear.
Richard Anderson moved his troops onto the farm of Henry Piper. Behind George Anderson's brigade in the Sunken Road was Piper's cornfield, which had yet to be harvested. Further behind that was an apple orchard, and even further was a hollow that held Piper's house, which Longstreet was using as his headquarters. Richard Anderson moved his men into the cornfield and the orchard. French's men on the ridge saw some of this and fired on these Rebels, causing numerous casualties. So did the Union reserve artillery on the other side of the creek, which also saw Richard Anderson's men as a promising target. One of the casualties was Richard Anderson himself, whose severe wound prevented him from placing his men in support of Hill. Brig. Gen. Roger A. Pryor took over from Anderson. Also down with wounds were Brig. Gen. George Anderson, who would later die from the wound to his ankle, and his replacement, Col. C. C. Tew, who was shot through the head as he acknowledged taking over command.
Confusion in the Sunken Road
Sumner's corps still had one last division. Maj. Gen. Israel Richardson was released by McClellan at 9:00 a.m. to reinforce Sumner. Richardson arrived across the Antietam about the time Greene was calling for more reinforcements. Instead of reinforcing the gains made by Greene around the Dunker Church, Richardson swung towards the Sunken Road.
The lead brigade was the famous Irish Brigade under Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. Meagher came up on the left of French's men. His men were armed with smoothbore muskets firing buck-and-ball, a particularly nasty load that acted like a miniature shotgun blast. It was particularly effective at close range. Meagher's plan was to pause at the crest of the ridge, fire two volleys, and then charge.
Waiting for the Irish Brigade was George Anderson's brigade, now commanded by Col. R. T. Bennett, and supported by the newly arrived brigade of Brig. Gen. Ambrose R. Wright. Wright's brigade was the only one in Richard Anderson's division to so far advance to the Sunken Road. When the Irish Brigade crested the ridge, fierce, bloody firing ensued. Two of the Irish Brigade's regiments took 60% casualties, most of those in the first couple of minutes. Meagher's charge was repulsed. The Irish Brigade laid down behind the ridge and fired on the Confederates just as French's troops were doing.
Pryor wasn't up to the task of adequately commanding a division. Most of the division was dispersed among Piper's cornfield and orchard with no orders when Rodes came up asking for reinforcements. Pryor's own brigade moved into the road, causing confusion in the cramped space. Featherston's Mississippi brigade under Col. Garnot Posey charged right through George Anderson's brigade and up towards the Union lines. It was wrecked due to intense fire. Wilcox's brigade, commanded by Col. Alfred Cumming, advanced but never even got to the Sunken Road.
Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell of Richardson's Union division moved up behind the Irish Brigade. He intended to swing around the right side of French's men and outflank the Sunken Road. His movements were so ponderous, though, that Richardson rode in and ordered him to relieve the Irish Brigade right away. Around noon, as Caldwell slowly approached, Col. Joseph Barnes of the 29th Massachusetts, a part of the Irish Brigade, decided to relieve pressure on his line by himself. He ordered his regiment to charge the Confederates. By coincidence, it was at this time that Col. Posey tried to pull his men out of the Sunken Road to relieve the crowding. The withdrawal went out of control and word spread that the Confederates were in the midst of a general retreat. Posey's men and Pryor's brigade broke for the rear. They ran through Wilcox's brigade and broke them as well. Half of George Anderson's men went with them. The only regiments left on the right flank were the 2nd and 14th North Carolina.
At almost the same time Lt. Col. J. N. Lightfoot pulled his 6th Alabama regiment out of the Sunken Road on the Confederate left. Lightfoot's regiment sat on the far left of the Confederate line in an area where the Sunken Road rose to almost ground level. As French's men were joined by the Irish Brigade, the fire on the 6th Alabama turned fierce. Lightfoot looked to Rodes for relief. Rodes told him to pull the right side of his regiment back to a more sheltered location. Lightfoot misunderstood the order and pulled out the entire 6th Alabama. He compounded this error when he was asked by the commander of neighbouring regiment if the retreat was ordered for the entire brigade. Lightfoot said that he believed it was, and word soon spread to the other five regiments of Rodes' brigade. Soon the entire brigade was in retreat. Rodes had been preoccupied with helping a wounded aide off the field. When he saw his brigade retreat he managed to pull together a battle line near the Hagerstown turnpike. The damage was already done, with only the North Carolinians holding the road.
Caldwell had very little control over his brigade, but this was made up for by initiative shown by his regimental officers. Col. Francis Barlow commanded both the 61st and 64th New York regiments. He jumped on the Rebels' mistake and straddled the Sunken Road. The horrible enfilading fire soon cut down the North Carolinians, who broke for the rear leaving behind 300 prisoners. Once the Sunken Road was abandoned, Richardson pushed all the troops he could find — including French's — across the Sunken Road and into the Piper cornfield.
While the Irish Brigade was making its advance, Greene still held the Dunker Church area. Along with his own brigade he managed to pull together some other Twelfth Corps units, including two pieces of artillery, for a total force of about 1,350. He asked for help from Sumner but was refused. No one told him what had happened to Sedgwick, and he wouldn't find out until around noon. He assumed that Sumner was in the woods off to his right and even ordered his men not to fire in that direction.
Longstreet had devised a plan to relieve some of the pressure off the Sunken Road. He pulled together a small assault force consisting of Cobb's small brigade of 250 men from McLaws' division and 675 men in two regiments — the 3rd Arkansas and the 27th North Carolina — from Brig. Gen. John G. Walker's division. Longstreet put them under the command of 29 year old Col. John. R. Cooke, who already had joint command of the 3rd Arkansas and the 27th North Carolina.
Cooke began by skirmishing with Greene's men in the West Woods near the Dunker Church. One of Walker's officers, Col. Matthew W. Ransom of the 49th North Carolina, sent his regiment at Greene from the area Greene thought was held by Sedgwick. They surprised the Purnell Legion of Maryland and the 13th New Jersey with a flank attack. The Yankees were sent running for the rear. South of the woods Cooke ordered his other units to charge the two artillery pieces just then moving up to support Greene. They managed to capture one of the guns and run the rest of Greene's command out of the West Woods. They pursued, but they were halted by three or four Union artillery batteries firing canister.
Longstreet ordered Cooke to hit the flank of the Union assault, hopefully breaking through in the area of the Mumma cornfield. Cooke moved across the Dunker Church plateau and into Mumma's cornfield. His two regiments were joined by Cobb's brigade on his right. They leapt into the Union flank facing the Sunken Road. The original intention was for Rodes' men to support this flank attack, but by now they had retreated out of the Sunken Road. Cooke was on his own.
The Yankees didn't panic. Kimball of French's division swung the 8th Ohio, the 14th Indiana, and part of the 130th Pennsylvania around to meet Cooke's charge. Barlow saw the opportunity and sent his regiments over in front of Cobb's brigade. The two lines slugged it out at under 200 yards. The Confederate's ammunition ran low. With no support in sight, Cooke had no option but to retire. He lost half of the men in his two-regiment command, while Cobb lost all but 50 of his 250 men.
Soon after Cooke was assaulted by another Union brigade. This brigade was that of Col. William H. Irwin. Irwin was from Maj. Gen. William F. Smith's division of Franklin's Sixth Corps, which had just arrived on the field. Irwin was posted just beyond the Mumma farm to protect against another counterattack. Irwin was known for drinking during battle. Instead of adhering to his orders, he had his brigade head straight for the Dunker Church. Cooke's men and Ransom's regiment were waiting behind good cover. Irwin lost 224 men in the impetuous assault for no gain.
Back at the Piper farm confusion reigned amid the Confederate lines. D. H. Hill and his officers desperately tried to rally his scattered men. He managed to put together a mixed force mostly of Anderson's division with the intent of hitting the Yankees in their left flank. Hill sent them after the Yankees, but they were spotted by the 5th New Hampshire, which turned to meet them. Some Pennsylvanians came up to help the 5th New Hampshire. The Rebel counterattack faltered and then fell back to the Piper apple orchard.
Meanwhile Longstreet moved Captain M. B. Miller's battery of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans into the orchard. The battery fired rapidly into the cornfield, with Longstreet himself holding the battery's horses and directing fire. The guns switched to double canister rounds and tore huge gaps in the Union line. D. H. Hill put together a small force of 200 men and personally lead a counterattack, but it was easily beaten back. It did gain time for men of George Anderson's brigade to find a smoothbore artillery piece and pull it into the area. There were now 20 Confederate artillery pieces in and around the Piper farmlands, and these guns were about all that were holding the centre of the Confederate line.
Shortly before 1 p.m., Richardson saw the Union advance stall in the face of the Confederate artillery, so he pulled the men back through the Sunken Road and behind the ridge. His intention was to sort out his men from French's, resupply them with ammunition, and then send them against the Confederates once he received artillery support to conduct counter-battery fire. He asked McClellan for guns; he was refused. Out of the Army of the Potomac's 300 artillery pieces McClellan felt he couldn't spare any for Richardson. For instance, there were 44 guns sitting about a mile north of Richardson in the event that Lee might make a counterattack against the East Woods. All of the First Corps' guns were massed on Joseph Poffenberger's farm further north. The two batteries of Richardson's own division had been held back by Sumner. Capt. William Graham's battery had been sent to help Richardson, but the range of his smoothbores meant that he couldn't hit the Confederate artillery. The only effective support Richardson received was from Capt. Tompkins' Rhode Island battery, and that had stopped firing around noon when it ran out of ammunition. The battery to replace Tompkins' was driven off by Cooke's attack. All Richardson wanted was one or two batteries. With them, he felt he could split the Confederate centre wide open.
Richardson was talking to Capt. Graham when a Rebel case shot exploded nearby. Richardson was wounded and pulled from the field. He left the field expecting artillery support and an order from Sumner to advance. Brig. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, of Franklin's corps, was given command of Richardson's division. Richardson would die from his wound six weeks later.
The Union had lost 3,000 men attacking the Sunken Road. The Confederates had 2,600 casualties, about 30% of those engaged. The Sunken Road has been aptly known as Bloody Lane ever since.
Franklin is Denied
Franklin's Sixth Corps started to arrive on the battlefield at 10 a.m. His lead division was that of Maj. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith. McClellan ordered Smith to the Union right to aid Sumner. Except for Irwin's brigade and it's impetuous charge, none of Smith's men saw action. Instead Sumner posted them to a strictly defensive position. Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum's division was the next of Franklin's corps to arrive. He, too, was sent to help Sumner, along with two brigades of Porter's Fifth Corps from the army's reserve. Franklin's remaining division was actually the First Division from the Fourth Corps, attached to Franklin, under the command of Maj. Gen. Darius Couch. On the evening of September 16th, McClellan had sent it off to capture Maryland Heights overlooking Harper's Ferry. Couch was in Pleasant Valley when he received McClellan's order to come to the aid of the army. He wouldn't arrive on the field until the next day.
Around noon McClellan ordered his cavalry division under the command of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasanton to cross the Middle Bridge with some men from Fifth Corps to support several batteries he was sending across. The batteries and the Fifth Corps men were stationed to protect the centre of the army's line in case of a breakthrough by Lee and his imagined horde of reinforcements. McClellan also asked Pleasanton if he thought he could manage a full scale cavalry charge, in the style of a Napoleonic battle. Pleasanton wisely changed the subject. The result was that the army's cavalry spent most of the battle sitting in reserve or babysitting artillery against an improbable breakout instead of guarding the army's flanks, watching the road from Harper's Ferry, scouting for fords to the left of Burnside, or driving the guns off Nicodemus Hill.
With the burden of independent command removed, Franklin was of an offensive mind. He was all for attacking the Confederates in the area of the West Woods. When he arrived at Sumner's headquarters around 1 p.m., Sumner turned down his request. Sumner seemed depressed, demoralized by the loss of Sedgwick's division. Sumner believed that the First and Twelfth Corps were completely used up, and that Franklin was the only thing stopping Lee from rolling up the army's right flank.
Sumner's assessment of the Army of the Potomac's right flank was unduly pessimistic. The First and Twelfth Corps had seen heavy fighting, but much of the First Corps had spent a few hours recuperating. Together there were between 10,000 and 12,000 troops that could be mustered to stop any attack by Lee. This was assuming that Lee could stop the attack of Franklin's fresh force of 10,500 men split among Slocum's and Smith's divisions, and then counterattack in strength. Sumner was apparently taking McClellan's estimates of Lee's strength to heart. This begged the question: if Lee had such a large reserve force available, why hadn't he already committed it to smashing the Union right flank? If it was still assembling, where was it?
Franklin appealed to McClellan, and for the first time McClellan left his headquarters at the Pry House and crossed the Antietam. While his headquarters had offered a good view of the battle for Bloody Lane, McClellan hadn't been able to see the combat on the Union right flank and the Rohrbach bridge was completely out of sight. Messages arrived at headquarters by signal flag or courier. McClellan exerted very little direct control of the battle, contenting himself with preserving his army from total ruin when Lee's nonexistent reserves inevitably counterattacked. McClellan was preoccupied with the thought of preserving the Army of the Potomac instead of winning the battle. Losing the army would be a terrible blow to the Republic, but it was only a possibility if McClellan's heavily inflated estimates of Lee's strength were accurate.
McClellan seemed to be leaning towards allowing Franklin his offensive until he met with Sumner. Sumner painted such a desperate view of the situation that McClellan agreed to keep Franklin's corps back as a reserve. While Lee had committed all of his troops except those holding his right flank and A. P. Hill's division marching from Harper's Ferry, McClellan felt it necessary to maintain a reserve of more than 20,000 men. No further attempt was made to assail the Confederate left or centre. It was now up to Burnside to defeat Lee on the Union left flank/Confederate right flank.
Burnside Bridge
Map 4: The final phase – 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Public domain map courtesy of Hal Jespersen.
The left flank of the Union was held by Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's Ninth Corps. In front of Burnside was the Rohrbach bridge — later to be known as Burnside Bridge — a stone structure 125 feet long and about 12 feet wide. The creek flowed from the north to the south, eventually entering the Potomac. On the east side of the creek lay a fairly flat, open area in front of the bridge. Ridges sat to the east, on the Union side of the creek, beyond this flat area. The road from Rohrersville crossed the ridges about a quarter of a mile downstream of the bridge, followed the creek bank north and then turned at a right angle to cross the bridge. On the west side it wound up the steep slopes of the overlooking bluff before heading off towards Sharpsburg.
The ridges on the east side of the creek were open and under cultivation, offering little shelter. The only real shelter was along the road downstream of the bridge, but this area was narrow and only 250 yards long, so it limited the number of troops that could attack the bridge. The bluff on the west side was ideal for defending a bridge crossing. On top of it was a stone wall, giving excellent protection. The Confederates further fortified the position by piling fence rails and fallen trees on the wall.
Lee had originally placed the divisions of Brig. Gen. David R. Jones and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker on the Confederate right flank to protect it from the Union crossing at the bridge or the fords downstream. Walker's division and George Anderson's brigade of Jones' division were pulled out earlier in the battle to shore up the defenses at the Sunken Road. This left Jones with about 3,000 men. There were around 400 men of the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments, commanded by Col. Henry L. Benning, at the bridge itself, with good protection. The bridge was only about 100 yards away, well within effective range. Downstream was strung out the 50th Georgia regiment and a South Carolina company under the overall command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs. These 120 men were all the protected the downstream fords. Behind the creek there was a higher hill where Lee had placed three batteries of artillery. Further back from that, on a plateau in front of Sharpsburg now known as Cemetery Hill, Lee placed two more batteries.
A popular urban legend states that the Antietam was shallow at the bridge and that Burnside never checked the depth of the creek around the bridge. This isn't true. Union accounts tell of water waist and chest deep — even at various fords along the creek — and mention a strong current. Even if the water was only chest deep near the bridge (and it was likely that or deeper), wading it under fire was a suicidal prospect. The crossing would have been slow, with men piled up on the far bank waiting their turn to enter the water. The men in the water would have been "sitting ducks". Whatever his other shortcomings and mistakes, Burnside can't be faulted for sending his troops over the bridge instead of through the creek itself.
The command structure in the Ninth Corps was plagued by the politics that infected the Army of the Potomac. Burnside was in charge of the left wing of the army, in command of the First Corps and the Ninth Corps. Hooker's First Corps was taken away from him and moved to the right side of the army for the initial attack on Jackson's troops, with Hooker given autonomous control over the troops on that flank. That left Burnside giving orders to Brig. Gen. Jacob Cox, who was in command of Ninth Corps after Jesse Reno was killed at South Mountain. Orders flowed from McClellan, through Burnside, to Cox. That morning Burnside received a rebuke from McClellan's headquarters for his tardiness in advancing after South Mountain, with an order requiring him to explain himself. So, on the morning of the battle that McClellan himself characterized as determining the fate of the Republic, Burnside had to sit down and compose a letter explaining his prior actions. Burnside saw the hand of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, the commander of the Fifth Corps, in this. Porter was up for court martial based on comments he made about Maj. Gen. John Pope during the battle of 2nd Manassas. Those comments were passed on by Burnside to Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck, resulting in Porter's court martial. Burnside assumed that Porter had poisoned McClellan against him.
As a result of the rebuke and of having half his command taken away from him, Burnside seemed to give up on showing any kind of initiative. He waited for orders and followed them to the letter. Cox could have taken initiative himself, but he was in a precarious command position. He felt he couldn't do anything without it coming from Burnside... and Burnside was in no mood to show any initiative. Instead of Burnside or Cox directly commanding the corps, orders flowed through Burnside to Cox. Cox had command of the corps, but no real responsibility. Burnside had the responsibility, but not the actual command.
McClellan didn't send word for Burnside to begin his assault on the Union left flank until about 9:10 a.m. The order arrived at Burnside's headquarters by about 10 a.m. The reason that it took 45 minutes for the order to travel about 2 miles to Burnside's headquarters was never explained. Months after the battle McClellan claimed that the order was actually a repetition of an earlier order he had sent out at 8 a.m. No evidence of this earlier order has ever been found. Either McClellan's memory was faulty or he deliberately fabricated the story of the earlier order. At any rate, Burnside prepared his assault after receiving the 9:10 a.m. order. McClellan's original plan was for the Ninth Corps to act as a diversion in order to pin down troops that Lee could otherwise send to his other flank. Nothing in the order suggested this had changed. The order did specify that once Burnside had pushed across the creek and driven back the Confederates, support would arrive across the Middle Bridge.
Another popular, and erroneous, legend of the battle has Burnside fixated with the bridge without sending men downstream to find a ford. This is completely false. Burnside's plan was to send a brigade of troops, under Col. George Crook of Col. Eliakim P. Scammon's Kanawha division, across the bridge with the 11th Connecticut acting as skirmishers. Behind Crook's brigade was division of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis, which would follow up a breakthrough. While Crook was crossing the bridge, Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman's division and the rest of the Kanawha division were to cross the Antietam at a ford downstream of the bridge, sweep past any Confederates guarding the ford, and hit the Rebels overlooking the bridge right in the flank. This ford had been chosen for Burnside by McClellan's engineers.
Things went wrong right from the outset. The 11th Connecticut formed a skirmish line along the Rohrbach lane down from the bridge. It took casualties almost immediately. One company tried to wade the stream but was cut down in the water. Col. Kingsbury, the regimental commander, was shot four times. The regiment pulled back with a third of the men as casualties. Kingsbury was taken to the Rohrbach farmhouse, where he died. Crook was to march his men straight down the hill facing the bridge and across it. Crook hadn't checked out the terrain and got lost. Somehow he managed to lead his men 350 yards upstream, where they got behind a fence and began trading shots with the Confederates. He sent word to Burnside that he couldn't make it to the bridge. By now Cox had expected to hear Rodman's attack on the other side of the creek, but there was nothing. It was as though a quarter of the corps had simply disappeared.
Sturgis' other brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. James Nagle, tried their hand at taking the bridge. Nagle decided to have his men follow the Rohrbach road parallel to the creek while marching at the double-quick. They would follow the road to and over the bridge. No one would get lost. The 2nd Maryland regiment was in the lead followed by the 6th New Hampshire. Every Federal gun in the area opened up with an artillery barrage. When it ended, the troops moved out with bayonets fixed. The rest of the troops of the brigade gave covering fire. The assault was led by Lt. Col. Jacob Duryea of the 2nd Maryland. Almost as soon as it began its 250 yard trot to the bridge, the force was hit in the flank by horrible volleys of Confederate musket fire. Case shot from the Confederate artillery batteries west of the creek rained down on the attackers. The force took heavy casualties as Duryea propelled them toward the bridge. The column disintegrated, with the men grabbing what little cover they could. In a few minutes the 2nd Maryland alone suffered 44% casualties.
By this time it was around noon. McClellan could not see the action near the bridge, and so he sent a message to Burnside to hurry him along. Burnside ordered Sturgis to renew the attack with fresh troops. Sturgis now chose the brigade of Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero to assault the bridge with two regiments side-by-side instead of them stacked up one behind the other. Ferrero chose the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania for the mission. Cox went back to the plan he had for Crook's men. Ferrero was told to rush down the hill and assault the bridge head on, only this time Ferrero was given a better idea of where he was supposed to go. Two artillery batteries were pushed up near the creek for close support. As in Nagle's assault, the other two regiments of Ferrero's brigade were to give covering fire.
At 12:30 p.m. the 670 men in the assault party began their 300 yard dash. They ran down the hill toward the bridge, coming under intense musket fire before they even got to the hill's base. The men began to falter and it was obvious they would never take the bridge in one dash. The 51st New York peeled off behind a wood rail fence to the left of the bridge, the 51st Pennsylvania sought cover behind the stone fence to the right. They started firing back at the Confederates across the creek.
The Georgians had been defending the bridge since about 10 a.m., and they were running out of ammunition. The combined shooting from the Yankee brigade and supporting artillery was too much. Benning ordered his men to withdraw from above the bridge. The Union soldiers noticed the slackening fire and were quick to respond. The New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians poured over the bridge, capturing some Rebels that had been slow to retreat. The rest of Sturgis' men followed across the bridge. At about the same time, Crook discovered that his men could actually wade across the creek in front of their position. He moved across his brigade and linked up with Sturgis.
It was also at this time that Rodman made an appearance. Rodman had marched to the ford dictated by McClellan's engineers but found it was unsuitable. Somehow the engineers failed to notice that the banks of the creek were too steep and that there was a bluff 160 feet high on the Union side. The Federals had heard of a rumoured crossing point known as Snavely's Ford downstream of the Rohrbach Bridge, but no one had searched for it. This was the job of the cavalry, but in the two days the army had spent across the creek McClellan had refused to release the cavalry for reconnaissance missions. Rodman sent the 8th Connecticut to find it. They took sniper fire from the 50th Georgia, which apparently convinced Rodman not to force a crossing except at Snavely's Ford. The ford was finally discovered, but it was some 2 miles from the division's original starting point, much of it over rough terrain. It was close to 1 p.m. before Rodman crossed the creek and linked up with the force at the bridgehead.
The losses taking the bridge were comparatively light, with 500 Union casualties and 120 Confederate. Given the number of men engaged, this was as bloody a sector of the battlefield as any other.
The Federals now had nearly three divisions organizing for a drive on Sharpsburg. Toombs had pulled all of his men back to a stone wall half a mile west of the creek, so the only thing opposing the Union build up was Confederate artillery fire. Col. Thomas Key of McClellan's staff rode up to Burnside with a message from McClellan. Burnside was ordered to continue the advance, immediately. No word was given of the promised support that was supposed to cross the Middle Bridge. Key also had with him orders to relieve Burnside of command and replace him with Maj. Gen. George Morell of Porter's corps if Burnside balked.
Burnside was willing enough but he had to sort out a problem in his corps first. Sturgis' ammunition was still on the other side of the Antietam and most of his men had run out. Sturgis claimed his men were exhausted from their ordeal in taking the bridge. Cox ordered the division of Brig. Gen. Orlando B. Wilcox to take Sturgis' place. Wilcox was three quarters of a mile behind the bridgehead on the other side of the Antietam. It took two hours for Wilcox to move up and for Sturgis to withdraw to resupply. Cox wasn't able to give the order for the corps to advance until a few minutes after 3 p.m.
Pushed Into Sharpsburg
Rodman and Wilcox moved out with some 5,500 men. Rodman's division was on the left, Wilcox was on the right. Two brigades of the Kanawha Division supported them with another 3,000 men, Crook's Kanawha brigade backing up Wilcox and the brigade of Col. Hugh Ewing backing up Rodman. Sturgis' division was a short distance to the rear. Four batteries of artillery were brought across the creek for direct support. Wilcox was to head straight for Sharpsburg. Rodman was to march beside Wilcox and then strike Sharpsburg from the rear. If successful, they would take the town and cut off Lee's access to Boteler's Ford road, the Rebels' escape route across the Potomac River.
Opposing the Federals were the men of Brig. Gen. David R. Jones' division, now reduced to less than 2,800 men. On the left of his line, on Cemetery Hill in front of Sharpsburg to the east, he posted Pickett's brigade and Jenkins' brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett and Col. Joseph Walker, respectively. On his right he placed the brigades of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton, Brig. Gen. James L. Kemper, and Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs. The terrain south of the town consisted of rough going, with lots of hollows and ravines, leading up to a ridgeline. The ridge was cultivated and divided by stone and rail fences. In the middle of the ridge was the 40 acre corn field of John Otto. Running across the top of the ridge was the Harper's Ferry Road. The men on the right were at the military crest of the ridge. Along his line Jones placed 28 guns, with Lee promising him as many more as he could spare.
Of the two Federal divisions, Wilcox moved out first as he had the farthest to travel. His division straddled the Rohrbach Road, with brigade of Col. Benjamin C. Christ north of the road and the brigade of Col. Thomas Welsh south of the road. Col. George Crook's brigade was behind Welsh's.The farmland along this route was steep and rough. In front of Christ' brigade was a small detachment of Rebel skirmishers under Col. F. W. McMaster. As Christ me advanced, they were slowed by the skirmishers. The Yankees took fire from in front and to their left from Rebels on Cemetery Hill and the ridge line south of it.
The 79th New York regiment advanced ahead of the brigade. They pushing McMaster's skirmishers into a nearby house and mill, and into an apple orchard. The 79th was then pinned down, waiting for the arrival of the rest of the brigade. On their right they were supported by two regular army regiments under the command of Capt. John S. Poland. These men were from Sykes Fifth Corps who had crossed the Middle Bridge and who were guarding the guns posted there by McClellan. Poland believed the Confederates on Cemetery Hill were wavering and asked for permission to charge them. Sykes instead recalled him and his men to the bridge in order to protect the artillery batteries. That was the only help Burnside would receive across the Middle Bridge. The 79th was stuck in place while the rest of Christ's brigade were pinned down at the farm of Joseph Sherrick.
While the Confederates checked the advance of Christ's brigade, Welsh's brigade moved forward to support Christ and threatened to outflank the Southerners. Walker, commanding Jenkins' brigade, moved his men down to the apple orchard to support McMaster against the Yankees. Two guns from a Massachusetts battery moved up to within 400 yards of the orchard and fired on the Rebels. Walker held out for a while, but then the Federals charged the Confederates with bayonets. Walker had to pull off the hill to a spot behind a stone wall on the outskirts of the town.
The Confederate artillery on Cemetery Hill also had to pull out. While they were effective against the Union infantry, they were out ranged by the Union artillery. The Union guns conducted counter-battery fire on the Confederate artillery pieces without retaliation. Finally the Confederate guns could take no more and Cemetery Hill was abandoned. The Yankees pressed on to the edge of the town.
Rodman's division finally advanced with Col. Harrison S. Fairchild's brigade on the right and Col. Edward Harland's brigade on the left. Fairchild charged across an open field to the relative safety of a shallow depression in a meadow. During the charge Confederate artillery hit them with canister and shells. By the time they got to the meadow, Fairchild had lost about a quarter of his 940 men. They reorganized and charged up the ridge. The Rebel artillery on the top of the ridge realized that the charge wasn't going to be stopped before the Yankees got to them, so they limbered the guns and pulled out. Behind the ridge, lying in wait, were Drayton's and Kemper's Confederate brigades. The Rebels were behind a stone wall, their guns resting on the wall for support. Fairchild's Yankees came into view as they crested the ridge. The Rebels let loose and the Yankees fired back. This continued for about 10 minutes, then the Yankees — mostly New Yorkers — charged the Confederate line. The outnumbered Confederates were overpowered and retreated off the ridge and into the town. Some of Fairchild's men followed them into the streets of the town itself, but they were pulled back to wait for support. It was after 4 p.m.
Saved by the Light Division
Stonewall Jackson left the division of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Powell Hill behind in Harper's Ferry to finish up operations when he marched north with the rest of his corps on September 15. Hill's men rested for two days as they secured the stores captured in the town and handled the surrender of Yankee prisoners. Hill began marching for Sharpsburg after 8 a.m. on September 17, while the Battle of Antietam was well under way. The distance was 17 miles and Hill pushed his men into completing it in less than 8 hours.
The approach of Hill's so-called Light Division came as a surprise to Burnside. A Union signal station caught site of the division's advance elements around 3 p.m. They sent a warning to Burnside's headquarters, but Burnside was by then on the other side of the Antietam. If he got the message at all, it was too late. If cavalry had been freed to conduct reconnaissance missions, Hill would have been spotted a lot sooner and Burnside wouldn't have been surprised, and may have been quicker to act.
On the far left of the Union line was the brigade of Col. Edward Harland. The brigade consisted of the 8th Connecticut, 11th Connecticut, 16th Connecticut, and 4th Rhode Island regiments. The 11th Connecticut was cut up in the initial attack on the Rohrbach bridge, leaving the brigade with three effective regiments. A mix up in orders sent the 8th Connecticut forward on its own while the 16th Connecticut and 4th Rhode Island on its left still waited for their own orders. Rodman and Harland were forward with the 8th Connecticut when it moved up to link with Fairchild's brigade around 3:30 p.m.. They spotted Hill's men. Rodman sent an aide to warn the 16th Connecticut and the 4th Rhode Island. Rodman himself moved forward to warn Fairchild. He was riding across an open meadow when a Rebel sharpshooter shot him in the chest, mortally wounding him.
The 8th Connecticut moved straight ahead aiming for three Confederate guns that had just moved onto the ridge. These guns were the battery of Capt. D. G. McIntosh of the Light Division, sent forward by Hill ahead of the rest of his troops. As the Yankees advanced the guns switched to canister and then double canister. Huge gaps were torn in the Federals' line, but they kept coming. McIntosh ordered his men to leave the guns and save themselves as all the battery's horses were down. The Connecticut men captured the guns, only to discover that they were half a mile ahead of their brigade. Toombs Georgians and North Carolinians from Hill's division counterattacked from the front and side. The 8th Connecticut was forced to retreat with 173 casualties out of a total of 350 soldiers.
The other two regiments of Harland's brigade advanced into a hollow in John Otto's cornfield. The 4th Rhode Island had some experience, but the 16th Connecticut was untried. As they entered the hollow, Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg of Hill's division advanced his brigade to the south and west edge of the cornfield. There were more Federals but Gregg's men had better positions and were experienced. The shooting was hot, with the Federals taking the worst of it. The 16th Connecticut was poorly drilled and had trouble understanding orders. It was hard to see clearly in the cornfield. At one point the 4th Rhode Island was ordered to cease fire on what was thought to be another Union regiment. Actually it was the 1st South Carolina. When the colour-bearer and two officers went to investigate, the colour-bearer was cut down. During this lull, Gregg moved a regiment around to the right, catching the 4th Rhode Island in the flank. Harland arrived to reorganize his brigade, but it was too late. The 4th Rhode Island was wavering. The 16th Connecticut broke and took the Rhode Islanders with them.
The breaking of Harland's brigade exposed the corps' left flank. Cox had no option but to order Fairchild and WIll cox to pull back their divisions. The Ninth Corps had started its assault beyond the bridge at 3:00 p.m. By 4:30 p.m. it was retreating to a defensive position.
Col. Hugh Ewing, commander of the first brigade of the Kanawha Division, brought his brigade up to fill in the gap left by Harland's brigade. By this time Hill had three of his five brigades on the field: Gregg's, Brig. Gen. James J. Archer's, Brig. Gen. L. O'Brien Branch's. He also had Toombs' brigade, which Toombs had strengthened with remnants of other commands. The Confederates advanced. Some of Gregg's men moved into Otto's cornfield, headed for Ewing's Federals. Like the 4th Rhode Island, Ewing's men mistook Gregg's troops for another Union unit. They held their fire too long and were outflanked. They ended up joining the retreat. Gen. Branch rode up front while his men pursued the Yankees. He was killed instantly by a bullet to the head. This brought the total number of casualties among generals to nine Federals and nine Confederates.
The Rebels had 40 artillery pieces supporting the counterattacking infantry. While out-ranged by the Union's rifled guns, as happened so often that day the Confederate artillery fire was superior. By this point the Parrott rifled artillery on the east side of the creek was running low on ammunition. Cox formed a line protecting the bridge and the heights over the creek. This line took heavy fire from Confederate musketry and artillery. Burnside called for reinforcements.
At this point McClellan had just returned to his headquarters after visiting with Sumner. Suddenly a large artillery barrage was heard from the north. McClellan assumed that it was the long-awaited counterattack by Lee's hordes of reserves. He told Burnside he had to hold the bridge to the last man. He refused to send any of Porter's Fifth Corps guarding the Middle Bridge to Burnside's aid. The artillery barrage came from the 35 guns of First Corps on the Poffenberger farm. Lee had ordered J.E.B. Stuart to take his force around the northern flank of the Union army and to attack its rear. Stuart had seven cavalry regiments, the 48th North Carolina, 21 guns. It got as far as Nicodemus Hill and the high ground to the north when it caught sight of the First Corps, temporarily under the command of Brig. Gen. George Gordon Meade. Stuart tried to dislodge the Union guns, but Meade fired back and forced back Stuart's guns in about 20 minutes. Stuart considered the situation for about an hour before he pulled back his men.
Burnside was on his own, but the Confederates were happy enough just to bottle him up in front of the bridge. As darkness fell, the firing died down. Ninth Corps suffered 2,350 casualties. Jones and Hill's divisions combined lost just over a thousand men.
There was one last gasp of violence that day. During the afternoon Daniel Hill moved sharpshooters through the Piper farm and orchard to harass the Federals. Col. William Irwin of the Sixth Corps ordered the 7th Maine to clear them out. The regiment's commander was convinced the Colonel had been drinking, but followed his orders anyway. The 181 men got as far as the Piper barn when they were surrounded on three sides. They managed to escape back to their lines but only after half their number lay dead or wounded on the field.
The battle was over, the sound of guns and muskets replaced with the cries of the wounded and dying. The Federals had 12,401 casualties consisting of 2,108 dead, 9,504 wounded, and 753 missing. This was 25% of the men engaged in the battle. The Confederates lost 1,546 dead, 7,752 wounded, and 1,018 missing, for a total of 10,318. Although the Confederates suffered fewer casualties, their losses were a far greater percentage of their army. Many of the combined 1,771 missing were dead, either torn to bits or buried in unmarked graves. The numbers killed in the battle do not include those among the wounded who would die days, weeks, or months later of their injuries. The combined total of all casulaties was 22,719, making it the bloodiest day in American history. These totals don't include the losses at South Mountain or Harper's Ferry.
The total known dead of 3,654 exceeded the number of Americans killed in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (as of January 1, 2004, 2,948 were killed in the terrorist attacks, with another 25 reported dead and 25 missing).
